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Summary 
This paper compares the way in which two leading developing countries in the global debate on 
biotechnology have sought to translate policy commitments contained in international agreements on 
trade and biosafety into workable national policy. It is a complex story of selective interpretation, conflict 
over priorities and politicking at the highest levels of government. It connects the micro-politics of inter-
bureaucratic turf-wars with the diplomacy of inter-state negotiations and coalition-building. At the same 
time, the role of business and civil society actors, media and scientific communities, will also be shown to 
be key. 
It is argued that global commitments take on a fundamentally different shape once they have been 
refracted through domestic political processes. The analysis shows that competing policy networks that 
cut across the state and form part of global alliances seek to interpret international legal obligations in 
ways which help to consolidate their position within the bureaucracy. Working with allies in industry or 
among civil society groups, different government departments seek to domesticate loosely worded and 
often ambiguous obligations contained in trade and environmental agreements, such as the Cartagena 
Protocol, in ways which advance their political goals. This political manoeuvring takes on global 
dimensions when alliances are formed with international scientific, industry or activist communities to 
bolster positions adopted domestically. Likewise, domestic politics get played out in global fora as these 
agreements are being negotiated, where countries such as India and China have to adapt negotiating 
positions to a shifting sense of how the national interest is best served and navigating a course which is 
likely to be acceptable to key domestic constituencies when the agreement comes to be implemented. 
Each country also has a sufficiently clearly defined interest in biotechnology that international processes 
are regarded as an opportunity to “internationalise” domestic policy preferences and secure scope for 
discretion in national policy-making. 
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1  Introduction 
A key driver of biotechnology policy in all countries is international agreements such as the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety set up to manage the international trade in GMOs. While many countries had 
developed general guidelines on research into biotechnology, and some had provisions for the handling of 
transgenics entering the country before the Protocol’s arrival in 2000, very few had in place detailed 
procedures for risk assessment and biosafety management. At the same time, an increasing number of 
developing countries are joining the WTO and have become signatories to a range of agreements on 
agriculture and intellectual property rights, for example, that impact upon the way they handle 
biotechnology development and biosafety issues at the national level.  
The interesting question from the point of view of this research is the extent to which these global 
commitments change the nature of the national policy process in India and China. In this regard key 
questions include; how far and in what ways do they impact upon domestic policy processes of priority-
setting and regulation for example?  Which factors explain the different ways in which the same 
international agreements have been translated in the two countries? How have India and China attempted 
to reconcile their obligations under these international agreements with existing domestic priorities and 
regulatory structures?  
Both countries are now members of the WTO and have signed, though in China’s case not ratified, 
the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. As larger developing countries they are placed differently in terms of 
the political and economic power they are able to wield compared to other countries that have been 
studied as part of this research, namely Zimbabwe and Kenya. The two countries make for an interesting 
comparison because, despite a number of such parallels, there is much which sets them apart in terms of 
the course their approach to biotechnology regulation has taken and the role, for example, of business and 
civil society organisations in contesting the way in which the governments of India and China have sought 
to “domesticate” global policy commitments.    
It is argued here that global commitments take on a fundamentally different shape once they have 
been refracted through domestic political processes. The analysis below shows that competing policy 
networks that cut across the state and form part of global alliances seek to interpret international legal 
obligations in ways which help to consolidate their position within the bureaucracy. Working with allies in 
industry or among civil society groups, different government departments seek to domesticate loosely 
worded and often ambiguous obligations contained in trade and environmental agreements, such as the 
Cartagena Protocol, in ways which advance their political goals. This political manoeuvring takes on global 
dimensions when alliances are formed with international scientific, industry or activist communities to 
bolster positions adopted domestically. Likewise, domestic politics get played out in global fora as these 
agreements are being negotiated, where countries such as India and China have to adapt negotiating 
positions to a shifting sense of how the national interest is best served and navigating a course which is 
likely to be acceptable to key domestic constituencies when the agreement comes to be implemented. 
Each country also has a sufficiently clearly defined interest in biotechnology, that international processes 
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are regarded as an opportunity to “internationalise” domestic policy preferences and secure scope for 
discretion in national policy-making. 
This account is therefore at odds with prevailing academic orthodoxy about the ways in which 
domestic politics impact upon international politics and vice versa. While Putnam’s (1988) concern was 
with the ways in which the possibilities for international cooperation are circumscribed by patterns of 
domestic politics, Keohane and Milner’s (1996) approach aimed to look at how the process of 
“internationalization” is serving to reconfigure politics at the national level, even within fairly closed and 
autarkic societies. While both accounts generate important insights into the links between the 
“competing” arenas of domestic and international politics, each adopts a somewhat linear understanding 
of how one influences the other. The approach here is explicitly to understand how two countries that 
bear similar international legal commitments have processed, interpreted and “domesticated” those 
obligations in very different ways. This requires us to look at the political webs which bind global 
negotiations to intra-governmental decision-making on an ongoing basis and how these are contested and 
shift over time. Looking at the role of particular departments, and indeed particular individuals within 
those departments, it becomes clear that some are more embedded within global processes than others 
and that understanding their location within domestic political settings means understanding the policy 
networks they form with like-minded government officials in other countries, industry and NGO allies 
and voices sympathetic to their position within the scientific community. Viewed this way, the importance 
of policy styles, bureaucratic politics and transnational coalition-building to understanding the 
interpretation and implementation of global commitments, becomes clear.  
In policy terms, the paper suggests the limits of attempts to promote universalised and “one size fits 
all” models of biosafety regulation across the world. For reasons of promoting international trade and 
realising the commercial potential of GMOs, bodies such as the OECD and to a lesser extent the 
Cartagena Protocol itself, have sought to encourage countries to adopt broadly similar models of 
biotechnology regulation that are minimally disruptive of trade (Newell 2002). The issue is not just the 
appropriateness of standard prescribed measures for countries with enormously diverse ecologies and 
capacities for effectively regulating the trade in GMOs or undertaking rigorous risk assessments, but the 
naivety of attempting to generate political conformity through international law. It is clear from this paper 
and from other work (Mackenzie and Newell 2003), that perhaps the strongest and most effective 
pressures towards policy conformity in the global politics of GMO regulation derive from bilateral trade 
pressures and threats to bring legal cases at the WTO. These have been used to discipline those countries 
adopting regulatory models threatening to the interests of biotech exporters and often act as a far more 
immediate catalyst to action than the well-intended but abstract commitments contained in the texts of 
global legal instruments on biosafety. 
 
2 
2  Context 
Both India and China have relatively long histories of promoting and developing biotechnology spanning 
several decades. Each has seen in biotechnology the potential to deliver development gains through the 
application of hi-tech science to the industrialisation and modernisation of agriculture. Agricultural 
biotechnology potentially has a key part to play in China’s agricultural rural development. China faces the 
challenge of feeding 22 per cent of the world’s population using only 7 per cent of the world’s cultivable 
land (SEPA u.d). With high levels of rural poverty, declining yields from many key crops and damaging 
levels of pesticide use, technologies that promise to reduce reliance on chemical inputs and boost yields 
are a welcome development. The same is in many ways true of India, with problems such as limited land 
availability and a rapidly expanding population adding to a sense of crisis in agriculture upon which 700 
million people depend for their livelihood. Policy documents such as the National Agricultural Policy in 
2000 have strongly emphasised the role of biotechnology in helping to meet national agricultural goals. 
Because of this, both countries have sought to promote biotechnology development through strong 
state-funded research programmes. In China’s case, against a background of ambitious science 
programmes in Europe and North America (in the form of EURIKA and the Strategic Defence Initiative 
respectively), four top scientists made a proposal to Premier Deng Xiaoping, in which the development of 
biotechnology featured highly, which he approved in March 1986. This was to become programme 863, 
the platform of biotech development in China (MoST 2001).2 As far back as 1982, the Indian government 
established the National Biotechnology Promotion Board which became the Department of 
Biotechnology (DBT) in 1986. In the years following the creation of the DBT, the state sector invested 
more than 90 per cent of the funds in biotech research and development (Dhar 2002:7). Since that time, 
the role of the private sector has increased quite rapidly, whereas in China the private sector still plays a 
relatively small overall role in biotech development, partly because of the sorts of constraints on foreign 
investors that India removed in the early 1990s. Despite these constraints on private sector investment, in 
overall terms investment in the biotech sector in China vastly outstrips India. Total investment in plant 
biotechnology in China in 1999 was estimated to be US$112 million (in purchasing price parity terms) 
while the Indian government averages an expenditure of US$15 million per year (in PPP terms). 
According to Huang et al. (2001), even after private sector investment is added to the equation, plant 
biotechnology research expenditures in India are still only about 20 per cent of those in China.3  
In terms of approvals of GM crops, since 1997, Beijing has approved the release of more than 100 
genetically altered crops, double the number released in the United States (Smith 2000). Overall, 251 GM 
plants, animals and recombined micro-organisms have either been approved for field trials, environmental 
                                                 
2  The programme has been divided into five year cycles consistent with central government five year plans, with 
biotech featuring in each plan. 
3  In actual terms the budgetary allocation for all types of biotechnology in India has trebled from $150 million in 
1987–88 to $300 million in 1997–8 and $500 million in 2002–3 (‘Allocation to biotech up threefold since 1987’ 
Economic Times, 8 April 2003: 6). 
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release or commercialisation (Huang et al. 2001).4 However, as with India, only Bt cotton has been 
successfully commercialised thus far. Large biotech companies such as Monsanto are interested in 
developing Bt corn in China and have conducted field tests for the crop since 1997. At one point GM 
tobacco was also thought to hold a great deal of potential. In 1998 it became the first GE crop to be 
grown commercially (PANUPS 2001). Production of the crop was halted and withdrawn from the market 
in 1992 , however, as key buyers, such as Philip Morris, got cold feet following consumer resistance to 
GM products in general and the US imposed restrictions on imports of the product in particular 
(SiliconValley 2002). Rice has been the other area of commercial interest following Monsanto’s and 
Syngenta’s work on the “golden” rice genome project (Kurtenbach 2000). In India there is also some 
interest in rice, but the next crop that looks set to be approved is a variety of high-yielding mustard for 
which ProAgro is seeking approval for commercialisation. There are also a number of crops and 
vegetables at various stages of development and field trial. For example, contained field trials have been 
taking place in the case of tobacco, mustard, potato, tomato and brinjal (Dhar 2002). 
Traditionally, biotech development has been conceived as strongly consistent with the national 
interest as defined by the heads of the two countries. India’s Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee stated at 
the Science Congress in Delhi in 2001 that India’s vision included ‘shaping biotechnology into a premier 
precision tool of the future for creation of wealth and ensuring social justice especially for the welfare of 
the poor’. This vision, articulated in exactly these terms, provides the mandate of the department that is in 
many ways at the centre of biotechnology regulation in India, the DBT (DBT 2003). In China, support for 
the technology has also been declared from the highest echelons of the state. In his Government Work 
Report delivered to the National Peoples’ Congress in March 1999, then Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji said 
‘We should work vigorously to develop agriculture through science and technology, information 
technology and other high and new technologies, accelerate the work of breed selection and improvement 
and spread the use of advanced, applicable techniques which can increase production and income’ (Ma 
1999). The productionist paradigm which underpins Premier Rongji’s remarks reflects the way in which in 
China ‘the double helix has replaced the atom as the symbol of the modernization drive’ according to 
Smith (2000: 1).  
In the early days of biotech development in China, the prevailing attitude, as one official put it, was; 
‘First we have to make people rich, then security can be improved’. More recently, however, Chinese 
biotech policy has expressed a greater degree of uncertainty about the future of the technology, despite 
continuing levels of high investment in the sector.5 There is less consensus now than was the case even a 
year or two ago about the political and economic costs associated with following a strongly promotional 
position  on  biotech  and no new  crops have been  commercialised  since 1999.  This shift results  in part 
                                                 
4  Of these approvals, regulators approved 45 applications for field trials of GM plant varieties, 65 for commercial 
release and 31 for commercialisation (Huang et al. 2001). 
5  According to MoST’s annual report for 2001 of the six priority areas that receive funding ‘Biotechnology and 
advanced agriculture’ attract both the largest number of projects (30 per cent) and the highest levels of 
expenditure (27 per cent) (MoST 2001). 
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from strategic choices about the need to export food to European publics sceptical about the safety of 
GM crops. This signal was received loud and clear when Chinese soy sauce was rejected by the UK 
because it contained GM ingredients from the US. This was said to be ‘the most direct cause for the new 
labelling restrictions in China’ (PANNA 2001), discussed below. The move towards process-based 
regulations also suggests that China has started to follow a precautionary position more akin to the 
European stance than that of North America.6 The discussion below makes clear that protection of 
Chinese producers and promotion of China’s own biotechnology enterprises are also key factors in this 
shift of position. This helps to explain the restrictions on foreign investment that other commentators 
have taken as evidence of a “cooling” towards the technology. Overall it would appear that the 
combination of global market imperatives and domestic commercial considerations make what Huang and 
Wang refer to as a “wait and see” strategy the only viable and strategically sensible option to adopt, 
allowing China to keep open all options about its future agricultural development (Huang and Wang 
2003). 
While also affected by these global developments, the Indian government has faced a more difficult 
path in seeking public acceptance of GM crops. Their introduction into the country was swept up in 
broader debates about the pace of liberalisation in the country, the appropriate role of multinational 
companies in the Indian economy and, invoking powerful symbolism from India’s colonial history, the 
threats to national sovereignty posed by western control of key resources in India such as seeds. What is 
interesting is that India, despite these auspicious beginnings, is now looking to move forward with biotech 
development and approvals of GM crops at the very time that China appears to have a de facto 
moratorium on further commercialisation, at least in the short term. Despite this, the case by case and 
precautionary emphasis within India’s biosafety regulations, like China’s, places it’s overall approach closer 
to the European model of biosafety regulation than to that of the US.   
China can be considered to be pursuing a dual strategy in which it seeks to consolidate its position as 
a global contender in GMO production, but is also keen to open market channels to Europe and 
elsewhere where there is demand for non-GM produce. There has been some discussion, for example, of 
the suitability of China aping Brazil’s strategy of seeking to export GMOs from some areas and GM-free 
produce from other parts of the country. The Ministry of Agriculture has floated the possibility of 
developing the North-East into the world’s largest producer of non-genetically modified soybeans over 
the next five years (Reuters 2003a). This dual strategy would mean that China would ‘push forward fast on 
GM foods which offer high yield and resistance to disease while promoting GM-free areas for crops for 
sale to rich markets where many consumers still reject the idea of genetically modified food’ (SiliconValley 
2002). 
China has attempted to steer a careful course between biotechnology development and the provision 
of effective biosafety measures, a course that has been charted by the shifting winds of public opinion, 
trade pressure and ongoing re-evaluations of which positions make most strategic sense to adopt. China 
                                                 
6  Greenpeace interviews, Beijing, 7 April 2003. 
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has been a member of the WTO since December 2001, but also signed the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety on 8 August 2000 (China Daily 2002). Its concern with biosafety measures can also been seen as 
a response to trade imperatives. China fears that countries in Europe, as well as Japan and South Korea, 
may reject its products unless GM crops are kept under control (Silicon Valley 2002). Wu Kongming, who 
heads a panel of experts conducting safety tests for the Agriculture Ministry, commented that ‘The general 
sense is that the risks are too high and the market is too small’ for most genetically modified plants 
(NGIN 2002). 
India also of course faces a situation in which it has to reconcile its commitments under the WTO 
with its obligations under the CPB. While India has been a member of the WTO for longer, it will be 
become clear later that the country has also faced a difficult adjustment period with opposition to 
membership from the start and resistance to many of the required reforms in the agricultural sector. On 
the question of a “dual strategy”, while some groups in India have been pushing for an expansion of non-
GM organic agriculture, including Vandana Shiva’s Research Foundation for Science, Technology and 
Ecology, Greenpeace and local groups working on issues of agriculture and farmers’ rights such as Green 
Foundation in Bangalore, many barriers stand in the way in terms of lack of available fertile land and 
strong cultures of heavy pesticide use among farmers. For food grown on such land to meet the 
certification standards of bodies such as the Soil Association, they would have to be cultivated for three 
years without any pesticide use before they would be considered organic. This is clearly not an option for 
many smaller farmers in India. 
A further interesting element of the comparison, that will be returned to below, is the way in which 
the two countries situate themselves in relation to one another regarding biotech development. The idea 
of China as a biotech superpower has been invoked in media-led constructions that resonate in policy 
circles in India in order to underscore the enormous potential of agricultural biotechnology and the 
urgency with which it is to be tapped if India is to compete with China in this area (Newell 2003a). Slow-
downs in the process are regarded as missed opportunities to catch-up with China. P.K. Ghosh, former 
advisor to DBT and member secretary of the Research Committee on Genetic Manipulation, regrets that 
when Monsanto and MAHYCO proposed Bt cotton back in 1993, a decision was stalled which meant that 
India “lost the bus” that would have allowed them to surpass China’s technological supremacy in this 
area.7 Industry groups such as the Confederation of Indian Industry also draw on this sense of a zero-sum 
competition between India and China, where potential investors are “waiting and watching” to see which 
signals the government sends out about its likely stance on approvals for LMOs, to create pressure on 
government officials to speed up the approval process. Interestingly, Indian government officials also 
readily cite the savings in pesticide use, the absence of detrimental environmental affects and the positive 
benefits accruing to smaller farmers from GM crops in China in support of their advocacy of GM crops 
in India.8  The analysis  underpinning this narrative  is weak on detail,  importantly regarding  the extent to 
                                                 
7  Interview with Dr P.K. Ghosh, Scientific Advisor, DBT, Delhi, 28 March 2001. 
8  Interview with Dr S.R. Rao, DBT, 4 April 2001. 
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which there is scope to apply in India the Chinese model of agribiotech development. Key differences that 
are often glossed over in the rush to present China as a viable model for India to follow include; the 
different capacities for public sector research, the divergent degrees of dependence on external market 
acceptance, as opposed to producing for domestic consumption, and, importantly, the contrasting role of 
civil society in contesting the benefits of the technology.  
 
3  Trade liberalisation in the agricultural sector 
This section of the paper looks at those aspects of trade liberalisation that interface with the domestic 
commitments of China and India in relation to biotechnology and biosafety. Analysis is divided into; 
(i) the drivers and impacts of trade, (ii) global political strategies, (iii) styles of trade policy, (iv) reconciling 
rights and (v) bureaucratic politics. The purpose is to compare how the two countries have managed the 
conflicts, dilemmas and trade-offs that result from simultaneously implementing agreements which have 
different goals and are often incompatible with one another. This helps to shed light on the different 
actors and policy processes around biotechnology and related subjects in the two countries.  
On the face of it, the challenges which face India and China are, in many ways, identical. Both are 
globally significant trade actors with large domestic markets. Both face enormous difficulties in complying 
with trade obligations and each, albeit in different ways, has faced internal conflict over the appropriate 
relationship between biotechnology, trade and agriculture. Nevertheless, the different pace of liberalisation 
in the two countries’ agricultural sectors, which relates to their different histories of engagement with 
global trade regimes, has created distinct drivers of liberalisation as well as produced interesting political 
coalitions contesting the impacts and benefits of liberalisation. While conflict over the pace of 
liberalisation exists in both countries, in China the fissures are formed within government between 
globalising state bureaucrats, concentrated in the Ministry of Commerce,9 and those whose political 
agendas are better served by protecting rural China from rapid exposure to global markets. In India, civil 
society groups have mobilised around trade issues for some time and continue to be involved in debates 
around the appropriate relationship between intellectual property rights, plant variety protection and 
farmers’ rights, for example. Some have successfully formed alliances with elements within government 
concerned about the impact of such measures on rural livelihoods. The role of such groups, as well as of 
the farmers’ movements active on these issues in domesticating global policy, is discussed in Section 6.  
While both countries have been subject to intense foreign pressure concerning their rules on GM 
labelling in China’s case and intellectual property protection in India’s, they have sought to defend their 
interests in different ways. While both have worked to develop alliances within the WTO among fellow 
members of the G77, different policy cultures have meant that China tends to operate in a less 
confrontational manner in global arenas,  but works to keep policy options open at the national level.  The 
                                                 
9  As a result of recent restructuring, the Ministry of Commerce now subsumes the State Economic and Trade 
Commission and what was formerly known as MoFTEC, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic 
Cooperation. 
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government of India, on the other hand, is more comfortable adopting adversarial positions 
internationally, but has manifested less willingness or ability to use stalling and obfuscatory tactics at the 
national level in the face of global scrutiny. These trends are explored in more detail below. 
 
3.1 Drivers and impacts 
India’s path to liberalisation was set much earlier than China’s beginning in the late 1980s. By the end of 
the 1980s there were still only twelve private sector seed firms in India, focussing mainly on the 
development of improved hybrids (Dhar 2002). In 1989, under the Plants, Fruits and Seeds Order, the 
import of seeds was freed from government control. The proliferation of this sector of the market took 
off after the National Seed Development Policy in 1988 which allowed firms based in India that had 
entered into collaboration with foreign firms to import seeds. The programme of economic liberalisation 
launched in 1991 served to hasten this process. Private sector investment in the seed sector in India more 
than tripled between 1993 and 1997 to a level of investment of Rs 19,850 million. In terms of share of the 
sector, judged by volume of seed sales, the private sector outstripped the public sector in 1996/7 in 
relation to both sales of maize and sunflower seeds. The National Seed Policy of 2001 seems set to 
consolidate this pattern of growth within a liberalised economy (Ramakrishna 2003). 
China’s liberalisation process has been driven by a combination of internal and external pressures. 
Internally, “globalising state bureaucrats” have sought to use WTO membership to lever greater power 
over provincial government, backed by influential economists pushing for the removal of barriers to the 
liberalisation of the economy in general, and agriculture in particular. The drive to liberalise markets in 
China has also come from exporters anxious to secure market access, however. A letter to US House of 
Representatives speaker Larry Combest from the US-China Business Council for example, signed by 
groups such as the American Seed Association and the Biotechnology Industry Organization, large traders 
such as Archer Daniels Midland and Cargill as well as individual firms such as Monsanto and Pioneer Hi-
Bred International, called on the US government to grant Normal Trade Relations status to China, such as 
is accorded to other WTO members (US-China Business Council 2000). Such status was thought to be 
key for market access for agricultural products as well as for obliging China to reform its monopoly state 
purchasing agencies and stop the subsidization of exports. Slightly more ominously for China, for the US-
China Business Council, a key attraction of China’s membership of WTO is that ‘The US will have 
recourse to the WTO dispute settlement mechanisms should China not live up to any of its obligations’ 
(US-China Business Council 2000). 
In advance of the deal, bold claims were made about the gains to US agriculture of China’s 
membership of the WTO. Agriculture Secretary Dan Glickman said that this would result in $2 billion per 
year in expanded exports to China (Solomon 2000). 
But, the extent to which US agribusiness can realise foreseen gains in practice remains a moot point. 
China’s Chief WTO negotiator and Vice Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic 
8 
Cooperation,10 Long Yongtu, said in the Guangzhou Daily that although China had agreed to allow 7.3 
million tonnes of wheat from the US to be exported each year, it was a “complete misunderstanding” to 
expect this grain to enter China. Instead, such exports remained a theoretical opportunity (The Agribusiness 
Examiner 2000). Long’s response suggests that, whatever the letter of the agreement, the Chinese 
government will not let its producers feel the full effects of global market competition over night, and 
perhaps points to what has been referred to as ‘entrenched bureaucratic opposition to the implementation 
of WTO-consistent rules’ (China Business Review 2002). Beyond resistance at the centre, Thiers (2002: 
413) also highlights the importance of local resistance to the implementation of international trade regimes 
as officials at province level seek to maintain protection against imports. Under this interpretation, hopes 
that WTO membership would serve to regularise many of China’s legal and economic practices appear 
optimistic and premature (Blum 2002).11 Clearly then, the formal agreements granting China entry to the 
world’s most significant trading club is just the first step in a complex liberalisation process that will not 
unfold smoothly or predictably.  
It is also the case that the immediate gains for China are not clear. As the US-China Business Council 
proudly boasts, ‘While the United States gains access to its growing market, China does not gain any 
greater access to the US market under the negotiated agreement, making it a win-win for American 
agriculture’ (US Business Council 2000). Nolt claims; ‘The . . . agreement imposes much more substantial 
concessions on China than on the US, which merely grants permanently what it has long granted annually 
anyway’ (Nolt 1999: 2), while providing other states with protection from a rise in Chinese imports 
(Breslin 2003). China is at a large disadvantage in this relationship because of the extent of subsidies 
received by US farmers and the way in which, by contrast, farmers in China are taxed by the state (Lu 
2001). Proposals to address this problem, and therefore to redress this imbalance, run into the problem 
that village leaders depend on this taxation for income and are reluctant to relinquish it.12  
The precise impact of liberalisation in China’s agricultural sector is not yet clear. However, Smith 
paints a stark scenario 
 
Chinese farmland is fragmented into tiny plots, each worked by several people, and the costs to grow 
a bushel of wheat, rice or corn is higher than in the United States or Europe. After China joins the 
WTO, a move that will wipe out many import restrictions on foreign agricultural products, the 
country’s slender farm incomes will shrink even more than they already have from falling grain prices 
and rising expenses. 
(Smith 2000: 1) 
 
Wang argues that it is precisely those groups who have borne the costs of other recent reforms that will be 
hit hardest by the implementation of WTO commitments. Politically this is significant because ‘those 
                                                 
10  MoFTEC is now subsumed within a new Ministry of Commerce. 
11  A white house statement in March 2000 declared confidently that ‘China’s accession to the WTO will . . . 
increase the likelihood that it will play by global rules’ (cited in Breslin 2003: 25). 
12  Interview with Prof Xia Youfu, 4 April 2003. 
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losers happen to be the social groups that have long served as the political bases of the communist regime’ 
(2000: 373). Specifically in relation to seeds, cuts in duties may threaten farmers producing grains like corn 
and soybeans which are more expensive and of poorer quality than imported seeds. In addition, 
production efficiency is still relatively low in China and domestic grain prices are normally higher than 
international prices. This is also true of India, and the greatest fear among many seed traders in India is 
the threat posed by cheap Chinese seeds to their own livelihoods. In response, some Indian firms seek to 
distinguish their products on the basis of quality, comparing them favourably to the cheap material 
produced in a country where regulations exist in “name only”.13 The trust they have established with the 
buyers of their seed also provides an important advantage, because as employees of Rallis proclaim, 
‘farmers want to be able to go to distributors if there is a problem, you can’t do this with Chinese seeds’.14 
In the long-term, however, biotech companies have tried to suggest that the “crisis” in Chinese 
agriculture can only be offset by the adoption of their products. David Shi, Monsanto’s government and 
public affairs director, argues that while imported grains will pose a threat to local grains once China 
opens up, ‘Chinese farmers now earn only 400 yuan per mu (1/15 hectare). But with our Bt technology, 
they could earn 300 yuan more per mu’ (Reuters 1999). Many in China are sceptical of these claims and 
would prefer to see imports of soybeans that are GM free from Brazil rather than accept the growth of 
GM soy in China. Indeed a South-South trade with countries such as Brazil is seen by some as a viable 
option to reduce China’s dependence on GM imports from the US. China is also the largest exporter of 
maize in Asia and is now exporting non-GM maize to Brazil. The desire to preserve this position may help 
to explain the government’s stance on imports of Bt corn from Monsanto, discussed below. Bai Jinming, 
Deputy Director General of the Ministry of Agriculture has also emphasised the “key role” of China’s 
own so-called “dragonhead agribusinesses” in meeting some of the challenges of WTO accession because 
they are closer to farmers and better placed to boost agricultural production in rural areas that will be 
increasingly important in the face of global competition (Bai 2001).  
An assessment of the impact of trade liberalising measures in China is further complicated by the 
ambiguity surrounding China’s status within the WTO. Though it is officially treated as a developing 
country and receives special and differentiated treatment,15 its accession agreement, perhaps the most 
restrictive of all new entry deals, made far more concessions than other developing countries and even 
some developed countries have done in the past (Breslin 2003). For example, while developing countries 
can have a limit of 10 per cent agricultural subsidies, China’s final agreement was for subsidies for 
agricultural production at 8.5 per cent of the value of farm output. The deal was a product of a 
combination of international posturing and domestic coalition-building. While there was, and remains, 
significant disquiet in some quarters about the impact of liberalisation, particularly in the agricultural 
                                                 
13  Interview with seed company representative.  
14  Interviews with Dr Ramanujan (scientist), Dr B. Dutta (Biotech Science Officer), Dr V.R.Patil, (Head 
Biotechnology Division), Rallis, Bangalore, 11 May 2001. 
15  For example a generalised system of preferences allows special consideration for exports from developed 
states. Developing country status also means continued import restrictions in agriculture and protection for 
infant industries for example. 
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sector, as noted above, “globalising state bureaucrats” within MFTEC (Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
Economic Cooperation),16 with the strong personal backing of then Premier Zhu, were successful in 
pushing the deal through (Breslin 2003). Lai (2001) argues that this exclusive decision-making circle of top 
Chinese leaders was ultimately able to circumvent opposition to the agreement, partly helped by the 
overwhelmingly positive coverage of the benefits of China’s entry in the media. The agenda of this 
globalising élite, according to Breslin, is ‘to lock China into multilateral trade norms and promote 
domestic political and economic change within China’ (2003). As an indication of their success in 
achieving this, MFTEC17 announced in May 2002 that more than 2,300 laws and regulations had been 
amended to comply with WTO rules and 830 abolished since the country joined the trade body on 11 
December 2001 (China Business Review 2002). 
 
3.2 Global political strategies 
Politically, China’s alliances within the WTO tend to shift according to the issue. On some issues China 
works closely with other large developing countries such as India, Mexico and Brazil in expressing 
concerns about the timetables for the lifting of quantitative restrictions or resisting more restrictive 
patenting provisions under Article 27.3b under TRIPs for example, which relates to the patenting of living 
organisms. Yet China also works closely with the Cairns group in pushing for the liberalisation of markets 
within agricultural issues on the WTO. Within global debates, India’s Ministry of Agriculture also forms 
alliances with the EU and countries such as China against those seeking to strengthen patent protection 
including the US, Canada, Australia and Japan. Yamin notes (2003: 39); ‘India [has] played a leadership 
role in the negotiation of the TRIPs agreement in at the WTO . . . defending it’s long standing tradition of 
limiting IPRs to protect public policy goals of advancing developments in the agriculture and 
pharmaceutical sector’. The foras where the two countries can advance concerns over farmers’ rights 
issues include the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, where alliances with other 
members of the G77 can be formed. Indeed, many members of the G77 group have been sharing drafts 
of legislation in this area, aimed at developing their own approach to the protection of farmers’ rights 
concerns.18  
It is probably fair to say however that neither India nor China have always been fully cognisant of the 
implications of the deals they have struck at the WTO. Some of the concessions made by China at the 
time of its accession agreement to the WTO perhaps go further than was acknowledged at the time 
(Breslin 2003). This is the case for the elimination of all export subsidies for example. Because of “single 
undertaking” provisions negotiated in the Uruguay Round, countries often have to accept a bundle of 
agreements even if they object to the terms and conditions of individual agreements. On presenting the 
Patent Bill to the Lok Sabha in India, Ramakrishna quotes the Minister of Commerce and Industry as 
                                                 
16  As noted above MoFTEC is now part of the Ministry of Commerce. 
17  Ibid. 
18  India signed the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture on 10 June 2002. 
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saying that India’s acceptance of TRIPs had been on a “take it or leave it basis” as part of a package of 
agreements (2003: 8).   
China is also finding it difficult to meet tough SPS and TBT standards in Europe and the US, which 
are often regarded as excuses for protectionist measures, imposing short time-frames and setting 
unrealistic standards.19 Despite these objections, the costs involved and the high standards of evidence 
required to bring a claim have served to deter the Chinese government from bringing a case to the WTO 
dispute settlement panel. It is also the case that in terms of significance for the agriculture sector as a 
whole in China, it should be borne in mind that, according to unconfirmed estimates, only 3–5 per cent of 
total agricultural produce in China is exported and therefore the significance of these standards in overall 
terms in shaping the direction of Chinese agriculture should not be exaggerated. This may change of 
course if China moves towards the production of better quality, higher value crops. One implication of 
trying to meet TBT and SPS standards, however, has been a heightened role for scientific expertise within 
government decision-making since the advent of China’s membership of the WTO and the requirement 
for technical inputs into discussions about sanitary and phytosanitary measures, for example. There has 
also been pressure on the Chinese government from the US, EU and Japan to centralise decision-making 
on trade issues so that governments and exporters do not have to deal with multiple agencies each with a 
different mandate.20 The merging of the State Economic and Trade Commission and the Ministry of 
Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation under the Ministry of Commerce can be seen as a move in this 
direction. This of course resonates with the calls of industry associations in India, mentioned below, for a 
one-stop, stream-lined approval process for biotechnology products rather than a protracted sets of 
negotiations with multiple government departments (AIBA 2000).  
 
3.3 Styles of trade policy 
Trade policy-making has come under increasing international scrutiny in the wake of developments in 
biosafety regulation in China. On 7 June 2001, the Chinese State Council announced the ‘Safety 
Management Regulations for GMOs in the Agricultural Sector’. Imports of GMO products were to be 
certified as harmless to people, animals and the environment before they could be sold in the Chinese 
market. The regulation required mandatory labelling on products before they could be retailed, with the 
State Council establishing a committee to supervise the evaluation of the safety of GMO products (Sun 
2001). The compulsory labelling rules were to come into force by 1 July and were welcomed by 
environmental groups, such as Greenpeace, because they located China nearer to the process-based 
labelling approach of the EU (Greenpeace 2002).  
Many, however, viewed the new rules as an explicit non-tariff barrier with the Chinese government 
‘intent on setting up the barrier before WTO entry to protect the domestic market’ (Sun 2001). Biotech 
companies were quick to suggest that China’s new rules on labelling and importation exploited global fears  
                                                 
19  Interview with trade specialist University of Business and Economics, Beijing, 8 April 2003. 
20  Meeting with Siobban Peters, Environment Adviser, UK embassy, Beijing, 8 April 2003. 
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regarding the safety of GMOs in order to protect its domestic biotech industry. Chinese government 
officials were keen to assure investors that ‘Concerns over GMO safety will not disrupt world trade’ as 
Minister of Agriculture Du Qinglin declared (Blanchard 2003). Nevertheless, the issue provoked a dispute 
that was so serious that according to John Gittings of The Guardian newspaper in the UK, it ‘at one time 
threatened to derail WTO entry and was only resolved at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting 
attended by the US President George Bush’ (Gittings 2001). The fact that rules on biosafety are thought 
to be grounds for questioning China’s entry into the WTO gives an indication of the strategic economic 
importance attached to the export of GMOs to China.  
Foreign biotech firms have not been left to fight the battle alone. Their positions on the various 
incarnations of China’s biosafety regulations have been actively supported and advanced by government 
officials acting on their behalf. Following China’s imposition of a temporary moratorium on GM soybean 
imports while regulations were developed, President Bush made a high-level visit in February 2002 to 
persuade the government to keep trading channels open while regulations on biosafety were recast. 
Referring to the trade in soybeans, a trade adviser to the US agriculture secretary said ‘it’s a billion dollar 
market to us’ access to which is being denied by ‘unreasonable delays’ (quoted in Gittings 2001). Chief 
agricultural negotiator, Allen Johnson of the US Trade Representative office said that after two days of 
talks with his Chinese counterparts his mission had been a success and that he expected that China would 
take necessary steps to ‘adjust its regulations so as not to hold up $1 billion worth of annual US soybean 
exports to China’ (Smith and Rugaber 2002). Agriculture Secretary Ann Veneman was also keen to echo 
the fact that assurances had been obtained from officials from the Ministries of Agriculture, Trade, 
Science and Technology, as well as the State Planning Commission and AQSIQ, the quarantine and 
inspection agency, that China will meet its WTO obligations and ensure that US-China trade is not 
affected by the new regulations (UDS 2002). Euphemistically, Veneman also suggested that the US stood 
ready to provide ‘technical and other assistance to help with their compliance’ with WTO rules and 
regulations (USDA 2002). Understating the case dramatically, Allen Johnson acknowledged that Bush’s 
visit helped pave the way for the interim settlement. 
In order to resume imports of agricultural products that contain GMOs, the Ministry of Agriculture’s 
GMO Safety Regulation Office in China issued its first batch of preliminary GMO safety certificates to 19 
foreign firms on 18 April 2002 and thereafter to a further twenty firms for products that have been 
approved in the exporting country and for which applications have been initiated in China (Dow Jones 
2002b). Despite this deal, further delays became apparent shortly afterwards causing concern among US 
officials and consternation among biotech firms. Delays were justified by the Chinese government on the 
grounds that ‘Some foreign firms did not provide enough material as required by the regulations, 
especially on safety evaluation . . . We can’t make our judgement based on the materials they provided’ 
(Yee 2002). The delay was a seen as an about turn by the government nevertheless after ‘Markets 
celebrated briefly after China agreed to issue temporary safety certificates to kick-start stalled trade, 
especially in soybeans where a billion dollars worth of trade a year with the US was at risk’ (ibid: 1). The 
change left foreign companies “scrambling” to re-submit applications for labelling imports under the 
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supplementary rules issued by the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA 2002). This experience seemed to realise 
the fears of traders that despite the agreement, ‘China’s trade ministry could still play games with import 
approvals for individual traders’ (Smith and Rugaber 2002). Nevertheless, the Chinese government look 
set to extend the interim rules, originally due to expire in December 2002, until April 2004 according to 
comments made to industry by officials from the Ministry of Agriculture (Reuters 2003b). This will apply 
to grain products for which tests have already been conducted. After this date firms are hopeful that full 
safety certificates will be issued subject to five yearly renewals in place of these temporary approvals.  
These episodes have led critics to contest the coherence and transparency of policy-making and the 
practicality of enforcing the decisions taken. For example, supplementary rules created by the Ministry of 
Agriculture in March 2002 required firms to provide information on the contents, size of the labels and 
where it is going to appear on the products (Yee 2002). The rules required process labelling for all 
imported biotech soybeans, corn, rapeseed, cottonseed and tomatoes. Some analysts suggested that the 
new procedures would increase the costs of importing genetically modified crops by as much as 10–20 per 
cent (Sun 2001). Many importers complained about the short notice they were given. The issue of 
transparency and the coherence of government decision-making featured highly in this discussion. One 
industry commentator noted; ‘One the one hand you are at the mercy of the agriculture ministry for 
certificates and in the other hand you need the quarantine department to get an import licence’ (quoted in 
Yen 2002).  
Often what causes complaint is the lack of details on implementation rather than the rules 
themselves, however. When Beijing announced the new rules on GMOs in June 2001, it fell short of 
establishing a process for implementation, a fact that frustrated many traders at home and abroad, 
especially those involved in soybeans. Such details are key for traders unsure about the implications of 
new rules for their orders when shipments may have to pass stricter quarantine requirements. A trader 
with an international grains firm in Beijing said; ‘We still need the authorities to spell out a clear timeframe 
before we can make any decision to book orders . . . without a timeframe it’s as risky as sitting on a 
volcano that will explode anytime’ (Yee 2001). A key concern then is that the vagueness of the regulations 
will provide few signals to firms and leave significant discretion regarding implementation to enforcement 
agencies (PANNA 2001). Skilfully invoking the discourse of WTO compliance in defending their actions, 
the government justification for this information vacuum, advanced by Long Yongtu, Vice Minister of the 
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, was that time had to be taken to ensure that 
implementation of the rules is consistent with China’s WTO obligations (ibid). 
Rather like in India, there are also reservations about the practicability of elaborate labelling systems 
for GM produce in China, which industry describe as “unimplementable”. Outside of key urban centres 
such as Beijing and Shanghai, there is little expectation that rules on labelling of GM ingredients will be 
applied in practice, at least in the short-term. There is virtually no evidence of labelling within Beijing, 
despite rules being in place proscribing the practice. In India, most foods are still sold on open markets, 
supermarkets are not yet common place and packaging is therefore not at all widespread. Given that 
packaging is the means by which consumer information is carried, it becomes easy to see why labelling is 
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viewed as unrealistic, even if segregation and certification systems could apply to products on entering the 
country.21 Currently in China, crushers and producers are meant to label products before sending them to 
supermarkets, but there is virtually no enforcement in the market place, despite the fines that can be 
levelled at the food industry if foods are found to contain GMOs.22 Segregation may happen by default, 
however, through the actions of major food retailers responding to consumer concerns by committing 
themselves not to sell GM foods in China (Greenpeace 2003).  
Ultimately, despite these constraints, EU laws on labelling and traceability (COM 2001) may require 
that more extensive tracking and monitoring of where products are produced and ingredients derived are 
required, even if full systems of labelling remain a distant prospect.  Exporters from India and China to 
other countries in Asia may also have to meet labelling requirements. Japan, Korea, Thailand and Taiwan 
have all now set up labelling schemes that exporters will have to conform to. External market drivers such 
as this and the work of the WTO recognised joint FAO and WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission will 
also have a decisive influence on the practice of labelling in India and China as elsewhere (Newell 2003b).  
 
3.4 Recognising rights 
As a member of the WTO, China will also be expected to meet its obligations under the Trade-Related 
Intellectual Property Rights agreement (TRIPs).23 When the TRIPs agreement took effect on 1 January 
1995, developing countries were given five years to ensure compliance with TRIPs (Yamin 2003). China’s 
patent law prohibits patents on plants and animal varieties under Article 25, even if individual genes can 
be patented (unlike many other developing countries) (MOST 1984). The rationale for this is that genes 
are treated as chemical material rather than living organisms which cannot be patented. When a patented 
gene is used to create a new variety, this protection does not extend to the new variety. Hence, while 
Monsanto has sought to patent the gene for its GM soybean elsewhere, it has not attempted to do so in 
China.  
Despite the fact that leading firms such as Monsanto claim to be keeping some of the best varieties 
out of China because of poor levels of IP protection, since accession to the WTO China has not faced 
significant pressure to amend its laws on patenting, considering itself largely TRIPs-compliant following 
amendments that were made to China’s patent law as part of the accession agreement to the WTO 
introduced in 1992 and 2000.. Hence, despite the publicity attracted to Greenpeace’s claims about the 
implications for Chinese farmers of Monsanto’s attempt to patent a soybean variety, discussed below, the 
issue appears not to have generated as much controversy as in India. Practical considerations also play a 
part here. Most Chinese firms in the agricultural sector are not yet in a position to benefit from IP 
protection and concerns have been expressed about the difficulty of enforcing a strict IPR regime in a 
                                                 
21  China has a greater level of experience of labelling systems, however, and so may be better placed than India on 
paper to meet any new requirements for product labelling. The country has standards for green, organic and 
“normal” foods depending on the level of pesticides that are permitted in their production. 
22  China enforces a 0 per cent threshold of GM content in products that are alleged to be GM-free, the lowest 
threshold in the world. 
23  China is also a member of WIPO (World Intellectual Property Organisation). 
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small-farm dominated agricultural system (Huang, Hu and Rozelle 2002). Companies such as Pioneer that 
work on maize with agricultural research institutes, for example, face no restrictions on their products 
because they are only involved in conventional breeding in China, while Syngenta focuses more on 
vegetable seeds in China for which adequate protection exists from their point of view.24 Securing market 
access seems to be a more important issue than IPR protection for most firms at this stage, though there 
is scope for priorities to shift towards the latter, over time (Noshab 2002). 
China also has a Plant Variety Protection (PVP) system in place. China’s position on this issue 
follows the UPOV 1978 provisions but there is a question mark over whether it constitutes a sui generis 
system as required under TRIPs as an alternative to patenting of living organisms. Notably cotton is not 
on the PVP list that China agreed to when it joined UPOV 1978 and is not included in the list of 
protected crops under it’s Plant Variety Protection regulations. Monsanto is making money, however, on 
its Bt cotton variety and though counterfeit versions of its seeds are being sold illegally, it has yet to lobby 
for change.  
Despite the proactive stances adopted in international fora, described above, India also continues to 
have to revise its domestic laws in order to make them TRIPs-compliant. The relevant legislation in this 
regard is the First and Second Patent Amendments Acts, the Plant Variety and Protection and Farmers’ 
Rights Act, which was passed by the parliament in August 2001, and the Biological Diversity Act (Seshia 
2002). When the attempt by the GoI to amend the Patent Act failed in 1995, the U.S filed a case against 
India through the dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO which found against India. In order to 
comply with the ruling, GoI enacted in 1999 the Patent Amendment Act to accept product patent 
applications from 1 January 1995 onwards and to provide exclusive marketing rights to such applicants 
(Ramakrishna 2003). Various adjustments have been made to the Patent Act to make it TRIPs compliant, 
but in the process the provisions excluding plants from patent protection have been significantly diluted.25 
Though India has had to introduce patents for micro-organisms and microbiological processes 
because it is mandatory under TRIPs, it has been able to restrict the scope of patents on life by 
prohibiting patents on cells, cell-lines and genes. The government was obliged, however, to set up a 
system for the protection of plant varieties given that the 1970 Patent Act excludes plant varieties from 
protection. India has established a sui generis system for plant varieties pursuant to Article 27.3(b) of the 
TRIPs agreement. The PVP and Farmers’ Rights Acts exclude plant varieties and seeds from patentability 
and allows farmers to save, exchange and share seed, going against the wishes of multinational companies 
that wanted to restrict the selling of protected varieties.26 In its general approach, as with China’s 
legislation, it follows the UPOV 1978 approach to these issues.27 Seshia notes that in spite of the fact that 
                                                 
24  Interview with representative from Syngenta China. 
25  The Patent Amendment Act of 2002 is due to come into force at the time of writing in May 2003. 
26  The Indian parliament passed the Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Act in 2001. It had not 
come into force at the time of writing. 
27  The Indian Act adopts the less stringent version of UPOV 1978 (as opposed to 1991) where Plant Breeders’ 
Rights are conferred only over ‘reproductive and vegetative propagating materials of the protected variety’. 
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India is not currently a signatory of UPOV, in drafting the PVP legislation, the PVP laws of 15–16 UPOV 
member countries were reviewed (Seshia 2002).  
Questions have been raised, however, about the consistency between India’s approach to PVP 
protection and UPOV, particularly concerning the “farmers’ privilege” clause in India’s approach which 
allows farmers to sell saved seeds to others rather than just re-sow seeds saved from their own holding 
(Yamin 2003). Hence, should it join, India may be asked to revise what may be interpreted as a violation 
of breeders’ rights. Critics allege that the Act is being rushed through with such haste inspite of these 
concerns ‘in response to international pressure and pressure from the powerful commercial plant 
breeders’ (Ramakrishna 2003: 20). The tensions, incompatibilities and creative interpretation of the 
commitments that the Indian government has agreed to by being party to these agreements support 
Seshia’s claim that 
 
. . . the emergence and expression of PBRs and farmers’ rights in the bill is not simply a cut-and-
paste transfer of provisions from international agreements to domestic legislation. Rather, analysis of 
both provisions indicates that it is instead importantly conditioned by the Indian policy context and 
the actions and interactions of individuals and groups within India. 
(Seshia 2002: 2747) 
  
Further evidence of India’s creative approach to domesticating global commitments is found in the 
approach taken towards IPRs in the Biodiversity Act. The Biodiversity Act provides that inventors making 
use of Indian biodiversity must seek the approval of the National Biodiversity Authority for any 
applications for IPRs inside or outside India. The authority can oppose the granting of IPRs outside India 
on any biological resources obtained within India. Yamin notes that; ‘Although the Act has been criticised 
by some as being unnecessarily bureaucratic and centralised, it is one of the few examples where a 
developing country has tried to create a framework for benefit-sharing with linkages to its patent system’ 
(Yamin 2003: 42). Whether this ambitious and creative approach will survive judicial scrutiny at the 
domestic and international level remains to be seen. 
Rather like in China, Indian policy across these areas is interpreted by critics as poorly coordinated 
and incoherent. There is significant overlap between the bodies of legislation, despite the fact that they 
were produced for the most part by different Ministries. This is the case for example with the Protection 
of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Bill that the Ministry of Agriculture has drafted, the Biodiversity 
Bill which the Ministry of Environment and Forests has taken the lead in drafting and the Patent Act 
which the Ministry of Science and Technology has drafted. Each employing different understandings of 
property rights, Ramakrishna claims; ‘It should be clear that these regimes cannot easily co-exist since they 
seek to protect the same subject matter but operate on fundamentally divergent principles’ (2003: 28). 
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3.5 Bureaucratic politics 
In both countries different ministries within the government have also adopted divergent positions on the 
trade agreements that the government has signed up to. For example, in India, while the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry is largely in favour of stronger forms of patent protection, the Ministry of 
Agriculture expresses concern about overly restrictive patenting practices. Such moves, argues Secretary of 
the Ministry of Agriculture, R.C.A. Jain, go against the principles of access and benefit-sharing enshrined 
in the Convention on Biological Diversity.28 This position has been supported by groups such as Gene 
campaign that claims to have organised over 400 meetings in 17 states on issues such as IPRs and in the 
process ‘significantly altered the government’s view on this issue’.29 Their strategy was to hold meetings on 
farmers’ rights and IPR issues in politician’s constituencies to maintain pressure on them given that “no-
one wants to be seen as anti-farmer”.30 The use of NGOs and farmers movements to bolster positions 
within inter-bureaucratic wrangles in such an open way is clearly in contrast to the nature of the process in 
China where such deliberations are kept within government circles, even if appeals are made to other state 
institutions such as Academies of Agricultural or Environmental Sciences to provide legitimation for 
particular decisions. 
On the Agreement on Agriculture, India’s MoA’s involvement in inter-ministerial meetings is 
bolstered by consultation processes with farmers, NGOs and others at state level which are used to claim 
that MoA represents the rural poor in these debates. MoA professes to be the vehicle for advocating food 
security and livelihood concerns in the biotech debate and participated actively from 1996 onwards in the 
debate about the lifting of quantitative restrictions. They have also pushed for “agro-economical” 
considerations of quality, income and access to play a part in the trials of GM crops overseen by RCGM, 
to enlarge the scope of the assessments. This commitment to food security and livelihoods is squared with 
support for India’s position on key WTO agreements. In Jain’s view, there is no adverse effect on food 
security of India’s membership of the WTO where anti-dumping policies and domestic support policies 
mean “there is no cause for worry”.  
Indeed, the view of many within the MoA on biotech, borne out in statements from both Jain and 
Deputy Secretary of the Department of Agriculture and Cooperation, Dolly Chakrabarty, is that WTO 
membership could have a positive impact on food security. Rather like in China, there is a strong sense 
that multinational companies entering India have to do so on terms set by the government. There is little 
fear, therefore, that policies on biotech aimed at protecting the rights of consumers to know, or to check 
the “greed and insensitivity” of those multinational companies seeking to “short-circuit” the policy 
process, will deter potential investors from operating in India. In the case of both India and China, this 
position seems to reflect a combination of assertive state autonomy regarding rights to determine investor 
entry on their own terms and a strategic sense that the huge domestic market that potentially exists for 
                                                 
28  Interview with R.C.A. Jain, Additional Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture, 3 May 2001, New Delhi.  
29  Interview with Suman Suhai, head Gene Campaign, 4 May 2001, New Delhi. 
30  Ibid. 
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biotech products in their countries will be sufficient incentive for companies to comply with whatever 
regulations the government regards as necessary. 
Because of the protests generated by India’s membership of the WTO, discussed in Section 6, the 
government has felt the need to involve a variety of civil society organisations in policy through meetings 
and consultations. Regarding the Agreement on Agriculture, Nitish Kumar, Union Minister for 
Agriculture, stated; ‘In order to prepare our proposals we started a process of wide-ranging consultations 
at regional level with officials of state governments, farmers organisations, exporters and experts . . . I had 
met with the farmers representatives, leaders of political parties and voluntary organisations and got their 
valuable views and suggestions . . . their concerns in this vital sector will be taken into account while we 
finalise India’s proposals for the negotiations’.31 The sensitivity of agriculture as a sector and concern 
about the lifting of quantitative restrictions generates great concern amongst farmers groups and 
government officials in India. The government has attempted to steer a middle course between an 
unbridled liberalisation strategy and a fall-back position of subsidy use and high levels of protectionism. 
The World Trade Scanner summarises the Indian government’s position; ‘only the combined benefits of both 
subsidised agriculture and unimpeded access to developed countries will guarantee food security 
sufficiently in developing countries and minimise the risk associated with developing country 
vulnerabilities’.32  
Similar patterns of inter and intra-bureaucratic politics are also apparent in China, where even within 
the Ministry of Agriculture, attitudes towards liberalisation in this sector shift between support and 
opposition depending on the issue and to some extent reflecting the concerns of the state seed enterprises. 
Such enterprises feel threatened by the arrival of large agrochemical and seed firms that are confident of 
their ability to out-compete Chinese firms working with lower levels of capacity and producing seeds of 
lower quality. Their fears have some basis. There is already evidence of the break up of the larger national 
seed companies in the face of pressures from private companies and traders. At the same time, the 
multitude of smaller seed firms are being consolidated in order to compete more effectively in the new 
market environment. The process China is now experiencing is in many ways reminiscent of the 
turbulence in the seed markets of India following the National Seed Development Policy of 1988. 
Overall then, despite different trade policy styles in terms of level of engagement with civil society 
and distinct political strategies pursued at the international level, both countries have faced significant 
bilateral pressures around issues such as labelling and patent protection. Each has had to make some 
adjustments or accommodations, delaying the implementation of proposed measures. But India and 
China, as relatively strong developing country states, have been able to preserve a degree of policy 
autonomy regarding the ways in which they implement their global trade commitments. In China’s case, 
obfuscatory and delaying tactics have been the preferred option. In India’s case, creative interpretation of 
the TRIPs agreement, for example, has been a strategy for maintaining choice. Both governments have 
                                                 
31  India and the WTO, Vol 2 No 9, September 2000. 
32  World Trade Scanner: BIG’s weekly index of changes No.45/08 February 2001 (Delhi: Indian Institute of 
Foreign Trade).   
19 
been accused of lack of transparency, bureaucratic incompetence and policy incoherence. The size of the 
domestic market in both countries means, however, that threats of relocation to more attractive 
investment destinations, used to such effect in other developing countries, are less persuasive in these 
contexts.  
 
4  Biosafety 
 
4.1 Role in the negotiations 
In the international negotiations on biosafety both China and India interact closely with the “like-minded” 
group of which they are a part (Cai 2002; Khwaja 2002). Although China has differences of opinion with 
the group, on issues around the conditions in which it is acceptable to block the trade in GMOs for 
example, it continues to align itself most closely with this grouping across a spectrum of substantive 
issues. Indeed, Cai Lijie from SEPA, (State Environmental Protection Administration) was head of the 
Chinese delegation and spokesperson for the Like-Minded Group at different points in the international 
negotiations. He is credited with maintaining a firm stance on issues such as the relationship between the 
Protocol and the WTO and the importance of adopting the precautionary principle in the agreement in 
the face of intense pressure from the Miami group.33 Equally, the Indian delegation played a key role on 
behalf of the like-minded group in resisting calls from developed countries to omit socio-economic 
considerations from the text of the agreement (Khwaja 2002: 364).  
Both India and China are signatories to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, even though China has 
not yet ratified the agreement.34 China’s ratification has been slowed by a tussle between SEPA and the 
Ministry of Agriculture over the extent of their mandates and responsibilities for overseeing the different 
elements of the Protocol. While SEPA is pushing for early ratification of the Protocol, MoA is seeking 
overall control over the implementation of the agreement as a condition for accepting early ratification. 
Ultimately, however, the final decision on ratification of the agreement will be made by the State Council, 
which sits above the other agencies involved in policy.  
SEPA has been the main government agency involved in the negotiations on the protocol,35 just as 
the Ministry of Environment and Forests has taken the lead in the case of India. Though leading on the 
CPB negotiations, SEPA does consult with the Biosafety Office within MoA through a small cross-
departmental meeting before each set of negotiations. In the case of India, the make-up of the delegation 
which attends the biosafety negotiations in departmental terms depends on the primary issues under 
discussion so that the respective presence of MoEF, as opposed to Agriculture, Commerce and Industry 
or DBT, can vary, despite a more continual role for individuals such as Dr Khwaja and Dr P.K. Ghosh 
                                                 
33  The Miami group is made up of key GMO exporting countries such as the U.S, Canada and Argentina. 
34  China signed the CPB in August 2000. India signed in January 2001. 
35  SEPA also hosts the focal point of the Biosafety Clearing House mechanism and co-sponsored the Asia-Pacific 
regional conference on Biosafety and the Biosafety Clearing House in March 2002 in Beijing. 
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who have accumulated significant expertise and experience of the negotiation process.36 It does seem to 
be the case, however, that MoEF tends to have the final say regarding the make-up of the delegation in 
advance of an international meeting.  
Given the sensitivity of the issue, it is unsurprising that responsibilities for biosafety management are 
dispersed across government in both India and China. In China, the Ministries of Agriculture, Health and 
SEPA each have officials dealing with biosafety issues that are meant to work together and exchange 
information. In practice, however, as one official put in, “rather like the UN”, it is difficult to coordinate 
policy effectively across so many agencies. Each ministry suggests a scientist to represent them on the 
biosafety committee. The inter-ministerial committee on biosafety, which was set up in April 2002, covers 
seven ministries in total including those mentioned above and normally meets twice a year though its 
schedule of meetings is not fixed. India’s approval committees for biotech products also have 
representation from all key ministries (Gupta 2000).  
 
4.2 Bureaucratic politics 
Despite the fact that MoA in China has traditionally played a more powerful role in biosafety regulation; 
covering the monitoring of field trials, import labelling, as well as research and production, some accounts 
suggest that SEPA may be carving about a greater role for itself within the new biosafety law that is 
currently being developed. While on many issues there will not be a significant change in responsibilities 
between ministries, there will be some amendments which mean that SEPA will capture a greater degree 
of responsibility, and hence secure enhanced resources for overseeing implementation of the CPB. A 
bureau made up of 13 departments and ministries is carrying forward the process of designing a new 
biosafety law at the moment,37 a draft of which is expected by October 2003. It is intended that the new 
law will surpass all existing biosafety policies and be broader in its coverage. Officials within SEPA hope 
that the law will magnify the effect that the CPB has had to date in shifting the balance of the debate in 
China towards biosafety concerns, raising the profile of the issues that SEPA has been working on. As 
one member of the Chinese delegation to the biosafety negotiations put it; ‘A positive impact of the 
Biosafety Protocol in China has been that other ministries pay more attention to biosafety issues than 
before’. In this regard, SEPA officials hope that the new law will mirror many of the key provisions of the 
CPB. 
These bureaucratic battles are also manifest at the interface between science and policy. The MoA 
biosafety expert group is primarily responsible for risk assessments of applications on a case by case and 
province by province basis. A range of experts from bodies such as the Chinese Academy of Sciences and 
the Institute of Botanical Research sit on these committees, though some indications are that up to 80 per 
cent of the members of the committee have biotechnology backgrounds while only 20 per cent are 
ecologists,  reflecting a bias common to many  regulatory systems,  including India’s,  towards  those more 
                                                 
36  Interview with Dr Babu, MoEF, 30 March 2001. 
37  Twenty departments will have to sign off on it. 
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likely to be in favour of biotech development than those more familiar with the environmental risks 
associated with the technology. This profile may also reflect the fact that the Chinese Academy of 
Environmental Sciences, from which SEPA draws its expertise, is less influential and qualified in these 
matters than the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences which works closely with the Ministry of 
Agriculture. Nevertheless, despite some objections, there is evidence of a prevailing consensus in favour 
of the precautionary principle as a guide to risk-based decision-making.  
Government officials claim to draw on elements of a variety of different approaches adopted by 
countries such as the US, Japan and the EU as well as international institutions such as the OECD and 
Codex Alimentarius in the design of their own risk assessment processes. This is similar to India, where 
risk assessment guidelines have drawn upon models used by the US Department of Agriculture, Plant and 
Animal Health Inspection Service (APHIS) as well as from biosafety guidelines elaborated by other 
OECD countries. One key difference in India’s case is a requirement, added to the 1998 Biosafety 
Guidelines, that safety assessments include an agronomic evaluation of a transgenic crop to determine it’s 
economic advantage to farmers (Gupta 2000). How India will square its commitments to sound science 
and precautionary decision-making with an assessment of socio-economic considerations is currently 
unclear. The ambiguity surrounding these concepts and the latent tensions between them that derives 
from the CPB, is in many ways reproduced at the national level through India’s biosafety system. Even 
areas of policy that are fairly tightly proscribed in the CPB can be subverted by bureaucratic politicking. 
Just as risk assessment procedures in China are subject to fierce bureaucratic in-fighting over respective 
responsibilities, so Gupta  notes that the impetus for India’s demarcation for contained use appears to be 
the need to ensure that the RCGM maintains control over field tests and biosafety evaluations of 
transgenic crops (2000: 25). 
Rather like in India, where there are tensions between DBT and MoEF over how to strike a balance 
between promoting biotech and protecting against some of the risks implied by its development, in China 
the Ministry of Science and Technology (MoST) plays a key role in promoting biotechnology through 
funding public research and helping public-private commercial ventures such as BioCentury, while SEPA 
has primary responsibility for managing the environmental impacts of the technology’s development. 
According to critics of the process, the fact that ‘MoA trumps SEPA most of the time’ is explained by the 
priority the government attaches to the function of biotech promotion over protection. Evidence for this 
is provided by the fact that funding for biotech promotion vastly outstrips that provided for biosafety 
assessment in the 863 programme for example. The balance may also be tilted towards biotech promotion 
over biosafety concerns by the incentive structures that exist within government that serve to speed the 
approval process. Pray notes that the Chinese regulatory system is ‘susceptible to political and economic 
pressure especially since regulators now have to earn part of their income through commercial activities’ 
(1999: 52). This means that ‘Regulators need enough government financing so that they do not need to be 
involved in commercial enterprises with the firms they are supposed to regulate’ (ibid). 
It is important though to probe beyond inter-departmental conflicts of interest and the clashing 
mandates over biosafety regulation in order to make sense of these contests over how to domesticate 
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global policy. There are divisions within the key ministries, such that the biosafety office within MoA is 
said to be pushing for stronger forms of biosafety regulation and even within MoST there are some 
individuals sympathetic to these concerns. Equally, on the issue of restrictions on foreign investment in 
biotech in China, the biosafety office within MoA is opposed to the rule, despite it’s own former seed 
division expressing support for something similar three years earlier. Hence, while John Killmer of 
Monsanto claims; ‘[China] have one foot on the accelerator, which is funding biotech research and 
development, and they have the other foot on the regulatory brake’ (ibid), it is clear that these apparent 
inconsistencies reflect genuine differences of opinion between government ministries and even between 
departments and individuals within ministries that attach different priority to biotech development, as 
opposed to biosafety protection. This apparently “schizophrenic” position is a function of different 
departments reacting to different realities and pressures from constituencies including international 
institutions, which in turn pull the government in divergent directions, the private and public commercial 
sectors, each with their conflicting preferences, and the large agricultural sector of scientists and farmers 
with a clear stake in the debate. As was noted in the section on trade liberalisation, individual policy-
makers are embedded to different degrees in policy networks that both shape their positions but also 
bolster them within bureaucratic power struggles. Policy stances only appear schizophrenic therefore if we 
assume that the government should, or indeed can, operate as a cohesive unit.  
These competing bureaucratic mandates and positions undoubtedly serve to slow the approval 
process for GM crops, however, as each department and ministry seeks to ensure that the issues it is 
responsible for have been properly addressed. Just as with the labelling debate, concerns have been 
expressed by foreign firms and the trade officials that so often speak on their behalf, that the approval 
process in both India and China is too fragmented and incoherent, dispersed across too many 
departments whose precise roles in the process are poorly defined. In India, this has led to demands from 
prominent industry groups such as the Confederation of Indian Industry and the All India Biotech 
Association for a consolidated one-stop approval process (Newell 2003a). US trade officials have made a 
similar request to Chinese regulators, expressing their preference for a single agency mirroring their own 
FDA (Food and Drug Administration) that would deal with all approvals.  
 
4.3 Enforcement 
Beyond the process of translating global policy commitments into national policy amid these competing 
pressures, just as we saw with labelling above, there are questions about the practical enforceability of 
biosafety regulations. In India in 2001, it was found that Bt cotton had been grown in Gujarat and many 
other states, having been supplied by the company Navbharat Seeds that distributed the seed without 
government approval. Micro-managing the seed trade with high levels of government control is almost 
impossible in large developing countries such as India where seed markets are heavily de-regulated. A 
representative of the Karnataka Seed Association stated frankly ‘There are hundreds of seed sellers in 
Karnataka. Regulation is an impossibility’ (Scoones 2003). There is also evidence of the illegal growing of 
Bt cotton in the Yangtze Valley in China. One official from the Ministry of Agriculture conceded that 
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when the area was opened up it was found that the Yangtze valley ‘was 40 per cent plus insect-resistant 
cotton already’. Huang Jikun puts this down to the fact that farmers are not waiting for permission to 
grow Bt cotton because of the benefits they expect to gain from growing the crop (SiliconValley 2002).  
Governing the transboundary movement of GMOs, as required by the CPB, also makes unrealistic 
demands of over-stretched and under-trained customs and quarantine officials in developing countries. 
Greenpeace have pointed to the ease with which imported soya, for example, can be grown illegally in 
China, despite claims that most of it is ground down.38 Their fear is that a situation similar to that in Brazil 
could unfold where seed smuggling and illegal growing have undermined the credibility of the 
government’s strategy of simultaneously producing GM and non-GM crops in different parts of the 
country without cross-contamination or seed mixing. This could scupper plans to develop the North-East 
of China, in provinces such as Yunnan, as a GM-free soybean producing area to meet demands from 
Japan, South Korea and Europe for GM-free products, discussed above. 
In both countries there are concerns that equipment and training are insufficient to fulfil 
international obligations to oversee the trade in GMOs with any degree of scrutiny or effectiveness. SEPA 
in China concedes; ‘there is a lack of safety management measures addressing the export, transportation, 
commercialisation, storage, use and waste disposal . . . national capacity for biosafety management is 
rather weak’ (SEPA u.d: 27). In addition, despite notional responsibilities that district and state 
administrations have in India or the GMO detection agencies that have been set up at county and 
prefecture level in China,39 capacity is lacking and most key decisions continue to be made in the capitals 
of the two countries. This is true for decisions on the nature of trials and whether or not products will be 
approved, for example. Hence, while province level governments in China are allowed to strike deals with 
foreign investors in some sectors, for seeds and GMOs, all applications have to go through central 
government given the sensitivities surrounding the subject. This is despite the fact that bureaus of 
agriculture at province level have to support a company’s application for safety approval to the central 
government. This contest of authority reflects the “dual control” between centre and province that 
characterises environmental policy in China (Sinkule and Ortolano 1995: 5). In India, there have been 
complaints about the arrogance of the central government in Delhi making approvals for the trial of crops 
in states without consulting officials in those states. The Minister of Agriculture for Karnataka claimed he 
only learned of the approval of trials of MMB’s (Mayhco-Monsanto Biotech India) Bt cotton through the 
media (Scoones 2003). A state biotechnology committee was set up only after the tests were well 
underway (Gupta 2000). 
                                                 
38  Greenpeace interviews, Beijing, 7 April 2003. 
39  For example training has been undertaken by MoA at prefecture and county level for 21 research stations for 
them to become GMO detection agencies. Officials at these levels are also responsible for submitting reports 
to local government officials who collect data on trials taking place. Having reviewed the data, however, it is 
still national level agencies that issue approval certificates. 
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With the domesticating of biosafety policy then, we see many similarities in the experience of India 
and China. Each has allowed environment bureaucrats a relatively free reign in the global negotiations on 
biosafety, but at the stage of interpretation and implementation, bureaucratic in-fighting has given rise to 
battles over the weight given to different elements of the Protocol, which relate in turn to competitions 
over mandates and their resource implications. Both also face common problems of the non-
enforceability of biosafety regulations and the ungovernability of the seed trade, within their countries as 
well as across borders. Unresolved questions remain in both cases, as with many other countries, about 
how commitments to trade liberalisation in the agricultural sector can be squared with the use of biosafety 
regulations to restrict the trade in GM seeds. 
 
5  Role of the private sector in domesticating global policy 
 
5.1 Access and contestation in India 
To a greater extent than in China, biotech companies, large and small, as well as seed enterprises have 
been actively involved in the design, development and enforcement of rules and laws on biotechnology, 
biosafety and patent protection in India. In order to influence decision-making processes around these 
issues, they have formed into associations and industry umbrella groups such as the All India Biotech 
Association or channelled their concerns through long-standing bodies such as the Seed Association of 
India or the Confederation of Indian Industry (Newell 2003a). These bodies have pursued a number of 
strategies to ensure that global commitments are “domesticated” in ways which reflect their interests and 
concerns. 
While the potential for growth and employment that agricultural biotechnology could bring to the 
economy is hotly contested in India, the prevailing perception amongst policy élites within government is 
that biotechnology can realise that potential, reflected in the pronouncements of the Indian Prime 
Minister and senior officials within his government, cited above. This perception is endorsed and 
encouraged by media-based and business narratives, but its acceptance is also a function of the social 
networks that bring commercial and policy élites together which help to nurture this consensus (Newell 
2003a). Some companies and associations clearly wield more power than others, but larger firms have 
been able to present the interests of their particular fraction of capital as consistent with those of capital in 
general. Such strategies help to fuzzy any distinctions that may exist between notions of what is in the 
national interest and what is in the interest of leading firms. While it is difficult for many firms to make 
this claim successfully, for biotech companies operating in India, the simultaneous potential for high 
returns, global market penetration and the prospect of addressing some of India’s food security needs, 
places them well to argue that their commercial interests coincide with those of the national interest.   
While access to skilled labour and adequate infrastructure place constraints on where firms can 
locate, large biotech firms consider themselves to be highly mobile in where they base themselves. This 
provides them with a degree of leverage over governments anxious to attract investors where they can 
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exercise a powerful threat to move operations elsewhere. The competitive race with China has been 
invoked by bodies such as the Confederation of Indian Industry, as well as individual firms, to steer a 
regulatory course sympathetic to industry concerns. Quotes from government officials such as P.K. 
Ghosh testify to the extent to which these fears have been internalised.  
The fact that these concerns bear heavily on policy-makers in designing policy instruments to meet 
global commitments is, in part, explained by the degree to which biotech companies have been directly 
engaged in the policy process. Leading biotech firms in India have been able to secure access to 
committees and key government departments involved in policy-making on biosafety issues. Accounts of 
the nature of industry involvement in the design of biotech regulations differ, however. Despite activist 
claims that DBT essentially operates as the mouthpiece of multinational biotech firms, many firms are 
damning of the delays in the approval process which they put down to DBT stalling because of its over-
cautious approach to biotech. This, for some firms, is manifested in the broad range and questionable 
necessity, from their point of view, of some of the tests they have to undertake to assess the biosafety of 
their products. Many such studies on pollen flow, or effects on cattle are deemed to be “irrelevant”, 
resulting from bureaucratic imperatives to ensure that the regulations are seen as legitimate and to be seen 
to be doing something. There is a suspicion on the part of some biotech firms that businesses whose core 
investments are in pesticides and chemicals and with whom the government traditionally has enjoyed a 
close relationship, are using fears about biotechnology applications to slow the growth of the industry as it 
competes directly with their potential share of the market. In reality, the fact that cotton is the first crop to 
go through the system may explain the protracted nature of the process on this occasion.  
In addition, despite industry protestations of lack of consultation over the design of regulations, a 
more plausible explanation is that while they enjoy close relations with some parts of government, this is 
not the case with all government departments. For example, while relations with departments such as 
commerce and industry are good, biotech firms have been less successful at getting a sympathetic hearing 
for their concerns with the Ministry of Environment and Forests. Firms that belong to CII and AIBA 
have been strongly supportive of common approaches to risk assessment and the use of principles such as 
substantial equivalence and familiarity, reflecting their ties to global industry groupings such as the 
Biotechnology Industry Organisation (Newell 2002). They have been unable to persuade environment 
bureaucrats of the merits of approaches to regulation that are minimally disruptive of global trade, 
however. While there is some acceptance among government bureaucrats of the value of standards on risk 
being set internationally and there exists some support for “mutual recognition” of other countries risk 
assessment procedures, there is reluctance among MoEF representatives to ‘rely on trials from the US and 
Europe’ as a basis for approving crops in India.40 Moreover, whilst also acknowledging that ‘things only 
happen when industry pushes’,41 MoEF officials are critical of the intensity of industry lobbying on this 
issue. Given this, it is perhaps unsurprising that NGOs go to MoEF first, rather than these other 
                                                 
40  Interview with Dr Indrani Chandreshek-Laran, 29 March 2001. 
41  Ibid. 
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ministries and departments that are considered to be more receptive to industry positions on the issue, 
such as DBT and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.42  
It is also the case that industry criticisms of the approval process should not be confused with the 
close ties that exist between leading firms and senior government officials within DBT. P.K. Ghosh, 
former Advisor to DBT, in particular, was lambasted by the Delhi press in 1998 over allegations of 
collusion with Monsanto-MAHYCO and by activists for his over-zealous approach to endorsing the 
technology without due regard for the procedures set up to approve GMOs. Those involved in decision-
making on the RCGM and GEAC committees comment on the way in which ‘Ghosh speeds the process 
up’ by bundling together a series of requests for approval.43 This haste, however, has resulted in Vandana 
Shiva bringing a case before the Supreme Court of India contesting the authority of the body that 
approved trials of the controversial Bt cotton crop (RFSTE 2002).  
In terms of the committees responsible for approving biotech products, such as the RCGM and 
GEAC, critics also allege a pro-industry bias in the selection of scientists that sit on the committees to the 
exclusion of critics. Scoones (2003) notes that the RCGM is overwhelmingly dominated by molecular 
biologists amongst whom there are high levels of consensus on the benefits of the technology. A similar 
allegation is levelled at the government over the consultation process that takes place regarding proposed 
amendments to biosafety regulations where a relatively closed and supportive group of researchers and 
NGOs are invited to comment on proposals, rather than a wider circle of critics.44 
Just as activists such as Vandana Shiva and compatriots draw on global networks of allies to contest 
the ways in which the government of India goes about meeting its global obligations (see Section 6), firms 
also use their connections to global coalitions to push domestic policy in a direction that accommodates 
their interests.  The Seed Association of India, for example, interacts with counterparts at the international 
level through the International Seed Federation.45 Leading Indian companies in the sector such as Indo-
American help to forge these connections where the company’s director, Dr Manmohan Attavar, sits on 
the Executive Committee of the International Seed Trade Federation (FIS), now part of ISF. Through 
being part of a global seed industry association, SAI and its members also come to be involved in global 
public debates which touch upon their interests. This would include, for example, debates about the 
additional costs associated with the trade in GMOs that may derive from both the CPB and its Advance 
Informed Agreement (AIA) and notification requirements and national and regional legislation on 
labelling and traceability.  
To a greater degree than either the SAI or AIBA, CII are very active in international policy debates 
on biotech issues working with groups such as BIO (Biotechnology Industry Organisation) and the Global 
                                                 
42  Interview with MoEF officials, New Delhi, 29 March 2001. 
43  Interview with RCGM or GEAC member, 3 April 2001. 
44  Interview with Indian activist, August 2002, UK 
45  The International Seed Federation resulted from the merger in 2002 of the International Seed Trade Federation 
(FIS) and the International Association of Plant Breeders (ASSINEL). 
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Industry Coalition, as well as with counter-parts in South Africa and Europe.46 The policy positions 
adopted by CII, embodied in their White Paper on biotechnology, resonate strongly with the line 
espoused by BIO with regard the need for “sound science”, WTO-compatible regulation that is restrictive 
of the use of socio-economic criteria as a rationale for restricting imports. These arguments have been 
used to contest the inclusion in India’s regulatory system of a requirement that crops are evaluated for 
their agronomic potential. From the point of view of bodies such as BIO, not only do bodies such as CII 
play a key role as transmission belts for the regulatory preferences of global biotech firms, but the 
credibility of the organisation as a “global” body representing industry the world over is enhanced by links 
to southern industry bodies (Newell and Glover 2003). 
Groups such as CII also play a key part in preparing the ground for Indian firms to capitalise on 
investment opportunities created by WTO agreements on agriculture, investment and intellectual property 
rights. For example, CII and the US-India Business Council launched the Indo-US Biotech Alliance in 
November 2002. The alliance is part of the US-India Economic Dialogue launched by Prime Minister Atal 
Bihari Vajpayee during his visit to the US in 2001 aimed at improving investment opportunities and 
business cooperation in biotechnology.47 CII has also undertaken its own “biotech missions abroad” and 
is organising the first “Made-in-India” show in Beijing in October 2003 where biotech will feature 
highly.48 CII see these visits as key to offset the image of India as a hostile investment environment for 
biotech firms. In playing this promotional role, CII has been at the forefront of persuading GoI to 
provide tax breaks for investors in research and development and for patented products,49 lowering duties 
and creating attractive infrastructures, following the model set by the information technology industry. 
While the government plays the main role in negotiating the terms of trade agreements in these areas, 
firms play a key proactive role in advising on the policies and measures that they believe will help the 
country to realise the fullest benefits from trade liberalisation, based on their regular interactions with 
overseas investors. 
 
5.2 Playing by different rules in China 
While the situation is somewhat different in China, in terms of the way in which firms engage the policy 
process, the level of commercial interest in biotechnology is, if anything, heightened. Many multinational 
companies view China as a large potential market for GMOs. Among them are Monsanto, Du Pont and 
Pioneer and from Europe, AgrEvo and Syngenta (Ma 1999). Different firms have demonstrated varying 
degrees of commitment to the development of biotech in China with Monsanto having most at stake. The 
most high profile foreign biotechnology sold commercially in China is Monsanto and Delta and Pine 
Land’s  cotton which was planted  commercially for the first time in  1998 in Hebei province  (Pray 1999). 
                                                 
46  Interview with K.P. Nyati, Head Environmental Management Division, CII, Habitat Centre, Delhi, 1 May 
2001. 
47  ‘Indo-US biotech alliance launched to boost fund flow’, Business Line, 9 November 2002: 4.  
48  ‘First made in India fair in Beijing in October next’ Financial Express, 9 August 2002: 9. 
49  ‘Biotech sector seeks tax sops’ Business Standard, 19 February 2003, p3. 
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This is in contrast to a company like Du Pont, for example, which imports genetically-engineered soya 
into China while also purchasing non GM soya protein facilities. Other companies, such as Pioneer, have 
entered into partnerships to produce hybrid maize seed, while for firms such as Syngenta,50 biotech is not 
prominent within their overall portfolio of activities in China,51 maintaining instead strong interests in 
pesticides and conventional (vegetable) seed trading. While there is some competition between the firms 
over cotton and corn, Monsanto is acknowledged to have derived a key comparative advantage by being 
first into the market in China. Nevertheless, the size of the market in China makes it worthwhile for 
companies to persevere in capturing even a small part of the enormous potential market that exists for 
their products. 
Most private investment that has taken place to date in China is from foreign firms through joint 
ventures or research work with public institutions. For example, Monsanto has initiated a research 
programme with several Chinese wheat research institutes to develop hybrid wheat, conducting tests in 
1998 with eight institutes (Dunphy et al. ud). Delta and Pine Land also had a collaborative research 
programme with the Cotton Research Institute of CAAS (Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences). 
Foreign firms typically collaborate with local firms as Chinese law requires them to have a local joint 
venture partner and only certain types of state owned enterprises can sell the seed of the major field crops 
(Pray 1999:48). In the example given above, Monsanto and Delta Pine Land established a joint venture 
with the Hebei Provincial Seed Company to sell transgenic cotton seed. The new joint venture company, 
Hebei Jidai Cotton Seed Technology Company Ltd, is the first cotton planting seed joint venture in China 
formed with foreign investment in cooperation with the People’s Republic of China. Delta and Pine Land 
China owns two-thirds of the new joint venture and one-third is owned by the Herbei Province investor 
(SeedQuest 1997). The venture followed an earlier attempt by Monsanto to seek approval for Bt cotton 
through the central government in 1990. Adopting a slightly different strategy, Pioneer has set up a 100 
per cent owned research company, but as Pray notes, the company ‘will have to join with one or more 
government seed companies once it is ready to commercialise its products’ (1999: 51). Joint ventures and 
collaborations continue to be restricted by weak forms of intellectual property protection, from the point 
of view of private firms, which makes them reluctant to work with state-owned enterprises for fear of loss 
of control of proprietary technology (Pray 1999; PANNA 2001). 
Besides the large foreign entities, rather like in India, there are a number of smaller “start up” biotech 
companies headed by entrepreneurial scientists from the public sector. The difference in the case of China 
is the strong degree of government financial support for firms such as BioCentury, which are effectively 
public-private enterprises, whereas in India firms such as Strand Genomics or Avesthagen have to rely on 
volatile venture capital funding for support for their work (Newell 2003a). Government programme 863, 
the platform of China’s biotech development, is explicit in its vision to nurture Chinese biotech firms such 
as BioCentury that will ultimately be able to compete independently against the likes of Monsanto. This is 
                                                 
50  Syngenta is the company that resulted from the merger between Novartis and Astrazeneca. 
51  Syngenta is currently only testing Bt cotton at this stage. The company also maintains a programme on GM 
rice. 
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done by encouraging companies and institutions to collaborate, providing companies with a legal title and 
allocating government research funds to companies to conduct basic research (MoST 2001: 15).  
It is against this background of explicit state support for national biotech enterprises that foreign 
firms operating in China have to adapt their political strategies to the accepted channels of engagement in 
China. Open lobbying, use of media channels and party donations are clearly not an option in China. 
However, despite the difficulties of forming formal associations, firms do meet to pool expertise and form 
common positions which they present to government. There are China offices of groups such as CropLife 
International and the Crop Protection Association which have a sub-association of members principally 
working on biotech which includes Monsanto, Bayer, Du Pont, Dow and Syngenta. The group has, in the 
past, submitted position papers to the government, though these have not been responded to. Whilst 
some verbal lobbying is possible, and has been used by firms, for the most part there are few channels or 
openings for formal inputs into the policy process. While the expertise of firms on certain implementation 
issues, such as the interim measures for example, is welcomed, for the most part their opinions are not 
sought as in India.  
It is China’s import and investment regulations that have drawn most ire from industry and 
government trade officials. It was these rules in particular that prompted the US trade mission led by 
President Bush to meet with, then Premier, Zhu Rongji. On 1 April 2002 China’s ‘Catalogue for the 
Guidance of Industries for Foreign Investment’ came into effect which included a set of rules prohibiting 
foreign companies from investing in GM crop development and the seed business. Although the joint 
venture operations of Monsanto and other biotech majors in China are unaffected by the regulations, 
John Killmer, President of Monsanto China said; ‘China has imposed the most restrictive regulations of 
the production, research and importation of GMO crops in the world’ (Dow Jones 2002a). The suspicion 
is that the restrictions were an attempt to protect domestic biotech companies against competition from 
stronger biotech multinationals. Behind this concern is the belief that China is exploiting international 
worries over genetically modified food to circumvent its World Trade Organization commitments to open 
up its agricultural sector to foreign competition (Dow Jones 2002a). Prominent biotechnology advocate, 
Robert Paarlberg, suspected that ‘the genetics issue is just an excuse to control trade’ (NGIN 2002).  
The fact that some individuals involved in setting these regulations themselves have interests in 
Chinese biotech companies such as BioCentury may add fuel to the claims of discrimination against 
foreign capital. One industry spokesperson said; ‘The problem is that on the biosafety committees, the 
referees and the players are the same people’. Keeley (2002) cites the case of an individual who holds a 
senior position within the company Biocentury but is also a key member of the committee in the Ministry 
of Agriculture that makes recommendations on applications for trials, release and commercialisation of 
biotech crops. The fact that scientists with their own commercial interests that sit on these committees are 
keen to block products from foreign competitors is confirmed by other individuals on the approval 
committee. While government officials claim that when applications in which committee members have a 
stake are being assessed the individuals concerned are excluded from the decision-making process, 
industries complain nevertheless that the barriers to approval are raised for foreign firms.  
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A representative from Monsanto suggested, for example, that while large data requirements were 
imposed on Monsanto’s Bt cotton variety, local producers were only expected to provide a few pages of 
data. Hence while Monsanto has consistently been refused biosafety approval for its Bt cotton variety in 
the Yangtze provinces, Biocentury was given permission to commercialise its Bt cotton in the Yangtze 
province of Hubei. Alleged differences between the varieties that are said to account for the reduced 
biosafety risks of BioCentury’s seeds, that were invoked to defend the decision, are highly disputed 
(Keeley 2002). It is also alleged that MoA intervened to ensure that cotton was removed from the list of 
protected varieties under China’s PVP legislation in order to enable Chinese firms to replicate and profit 
from Monsanto’s seeds. On this issue Smith argues, ‘China is trying to make sure that the lax protection of 
intellectual property rights and a selective approval process keep competitors in check while domestic 
companies have freer rein’ (2000: 2).  
For Monsanto, these delaying tactics are clearly intended to allow local producers to get their 
products to the market first, reflecting government officials’ fear that Monsanto could become a 
monopoly force in China. Non-industry voices also suggest that patterns of discrimination against foreign 
investors reflect the fact that China wants to develop its own nationally oriented and more autonomous 
biotechnology strategy. According to one western diplomat; ‘if China can become a leader in biotech 
development without foreign involvement, it will be a matter of pride, a national achievement, a high-tech 
sector that’s theirs’ (Dow Jones 2002a). 
Monsanto has claimed that extensive rules on research, production, food processing and the trade in 
GMOs will be to delay the commercialisation of the company’s Bt corn by about a year. Commenting on 
the repeated rejection of the company’s Bt corn over the past few years, John Killmer, President of 
Monsanto China said; ‘I believe that in general there is administrative and government guidance not to 
approve insect resistant corn’ (quoted in SiliconValley 2002). The company alleges that each time they 
seek approval for the crop, another test phase requirement is added in order to deny approval. Essentially, 
an extra step has been added to the approval process. Whereas previously GM crops had to pass lab tests, 
pilot field tests and go for environmental release before commercialisation, now there is an additional step 
of a production trial before mass production. David Shi, Monsanto’s government and public affairs 
director in China claims that the process of completing production field tests and getting state approval 
for applications could take 270 days (Financial Express 2001).  
But while companies have been quick to complain about this time-frame, it is exactly the length of 
time specified and permitted in the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. Hence whilst traders may feel that 
they are subject to undue delays in the approval process, by invoking this time frame the Chinese 
government is only enforcing its rights under an agreement which the US, for example, has not signed. 
Countering the claims unreasonable discrimination, Ms Fang Xiangdong of the Scientific Research 
Planning Office under the Ministry of Agriculture argues that;  ‘All foreign biotechnologies have to be 
approved by China’s safety committee on Agricultural Genetic Engineering . . . we’ve no bias whatsoever 
against foreign technologies so long as the companies have certification from their own countries’ (quoted 
in Ma 1999). Agriculture Minister Du Qinglin was also quick to emphasise that ‘Import controls are not 
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aimed at any one country or any one product’ (Blanchard 2003). In addition it remains the case that 
Monsanto, despite its protests, has already gained approval from the government to grow Bt cotton in the 
eastern provinces of Hebei, Anhui and Shandong and is awaiting permission to plant in Hubei and Henan 
(Financial Express 2001).  
On the issue of conflicting interests, the overlap between technology developers and technology 
regulators that we see in the case of China is also apparent in India and is a problem common to many, 
particularly developing countries, where expertise is concentrated in a relatively small number of highly 
trained individuals. Gupta notes in the India case ‘[the] two central committees . . . are composed of 
public sector scientists who are themselves engaged in transgenic research. This results in the not 
unfamiliar situation of scientists regulating themselves’ (Gupta 2000: 16). Hence what is constructed by 
foreign companies as anti-competitive behaviour, may also be the inevitable consequence of the same 
individuals being cast simultaneously as researchers, entrepreneurs and regulators. Scoones suggests, 
however, that public sector scientists, from the Indian Centre for Agricultural Research (ICAR) for 
example, with their own commercial ventures in biotechnology, have also played a “blocking” role, 
attempting to prevent the release of Monsanto varieties in preference for their own. He notes 
 
Bt cotton was under development in the ICAR system at the Cotton Research Institute at Nagpur, at 
IARI in Delhi, at Tamil Nadu Agricultural University in Coimbatore and at Dharwad in Karnataka. 
The Ministry of Agriculture was represented by ICAR on the GEAC, and some of the delays and 
requirements can possibly be seen in this light. As one senior university scientist involved in DBT 
committees put it: ‘If developed by Indian scientists, transgenics may have seen the light of day much 
earlier. 
(Scoones 2003) 
 
What separates the two country experiences perhaps is the degree to which Chinese entrepreneurs with 
access to government committees have been successful in denying market access to products from 
competitors, whereas their Indian counterparts were only able to introduce delays. This may be explained 
by the greater threat that foreign seeds are thought to pose to domestic producers in China and the 
unequivocal support that the Chinese government has leant to their own biotechnology firms as part of a 
more nationalistic vision for technology development.  
We see then two contrasting styles of engagement with the private sector with important implications 
for state autonomy and the weighting that is given to the expressed concerns of national and global 
biotech capital. In the Indian case, there are a series of well organised industry coalitions with multiple 
formal points of access and informal arenas through which preferences can be articulated. The higher 
profile of the private sector in India and its strategic importance to the overall health of the Indian 
economy, means that the preferences of globally mobile capital, represented to government through 
bodies such as the CII, have to be taken seriously. The Chinese government, by contrast, has not sought 
to engage the private sector in its deliberations about how to reconcile its’ WTO obligations with its 
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commitments under the CPB. The interventions of foreign leaders, on behalf of global firms, have played 
a far more significant role in shaping the way in which policy commitments are interpreted. A strongly 
nationalist approach to supporting Chinese biotech entrepreneurs has also provided an important steer to 
decision-making about China’s place in the emerging global political economy of biotechnology. 
 
6  Role of civil society in contesting policy 
The links between organised civil society within India and China and the international agreements 
discussed in this paper operate at many levels. Article 23 of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety calls on 
governments to involve the public in decision-making about the design of their national biosafety 
frameworks through public participation, consultation and education and awareness-raising. Governments 
have interpreted this commitment in a variety of different ways (Glover et al. 2003), but provisions such as 
this have the potential to create spaces for organised civil society stakeholders to influence national policy 
on biosafety. The case of China also illustrates their limits, however, where aside from “internet 
discussions” between policy-makers and the public, most “consultations” have taken place within 
government. Liberal understandings of the practice of democratic politics, contained in agreements such 
as the CPB, carry little resonance among government officials in Beijing and the sanctions that reside with 
the secretariat of the Protocol on Biosafety to penalise non-compliance with particular articles are weak 
and rarely applied.  
Civil society groups in India and China have, however, benefited from the debates and protests that 
have been sparked in other regions, such as Europe for example, which have provided them with leverage 
to initiate discussions in their own societies about what forms of biosafety regulation or trade strategy are 
viable in global terms. Connections to global NGO players such as Greenpeace and GRAIN have also 
helped to support the domestic campaigning work of groups in India and China. The activist list 
“AgbioIndia” hosted by the Indian group The Forum for Biotechnology and Food Security and the newsletter 
“International Biosafety” co-published by Greenpeace China contain many biotech stories from the 
world’s media, which in turn, are often derived from NGOs in those countries. They provide a route to 
publicise concerns about GMOs without, in the case of China, being seen to criticise government action 
directly. The connections also run the other way, where activist groups in the North can help to validate 
claims about the “global” rejection of GM crops through reference to the work of their counterparts in 
India and China. 
While, in general, the role of civil society groups in shaping policy in China is considered to be weak, 
one particular episode serves to discredit the assumption that civil society is a redundant actor in the 
politics of biotechnology in China. Greenpeace China became involved in a public debate, fuelled by high 
levels of media coverage, over the environmental impacts of Bt cotton being grown in China (Greenpeace 
International 2002). A report by Professor Xue Dayuan from the Nanjing Institute of Environmental 
Sciences (Jiangsu province) and advisor to Greenpeace came to the controversial conclusion that 
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After five years of growing, Chinese farmers and scientists are now faced with serious problems and 
confronted with the fact that too little is known about the interaction of GE crops with the 
environment. High hopes have been crashing down and reality shows that the information from the 
GE industry has been unsubstantiated. 
(ibid) 
 
What increased the impact of the report was that it was produced for Greenpeace by a state research 
institute under SEPA, the Nanjing Institute of Environmental Sciences. The study received coverage in 
the China Daily newspaper and so forced government officials to react to the claims and defend the record 
of Bt cotton in China. Government scientists from the Chinese Academy of Sciences were assembled to 
refute the claims made in the report, including the director of China’s Centre for Biosafety Research Peng 
Yufa who said to reporters; ‘Greenpeace is absolutely ignorant about genetically modified cotton and 
doesn’t know how to protect the environment’ (Kyne 2002).  
Interesting from the point of view of a comparison with India, is the way in which the study’s 
findings about the negative environmental impact of Bt cotton were picked up by activists in India to 
challenge their own government’s acceptance of Bt cotton for commercialisation. Devinder Sharma, Chair 
of The Forum for Biotechnology and Food Security in a commentary on the study argues 
 
The DBT, the Indian Council for Agricultural Research (ICAR) and the Maharashtra Hybrid Seed 
Company (Mahyco), which is collaborating with the seed multinational Monsanto, has always used 
the example of China to push in an untested and environmentally-risk genetically modified 
technology’ . . . Following the admission by Chinese scientists that Bt cotton is damaging the 
environment, the Forum for Biotechnology and Food Security . . . has called on the Prime Minister 
to institute a high-level enquiry into the dubious role of the Department of Biotechnology and 
Ministry of Science and Technology in supporting, promoting and hastily pushing the controversial 
modified crops onto gullible Indian farmers. 
(Sharma 2002) 
 
Greenpeace China was also involved in another controversial episode, though this time its claims did not 
run counter to government policy. Rather than attacking the Chinese government’s approach to the 
development of Patent Laws, Greenpeace targeted what they referred to as Monsanto’s “Biopiracy Plans”. 
The allegation was made regarding Monsanto’s alleged interest in patenting wild and cultivated varieties of 
soybean, a patent that would ‘grant the company an exclusive right on soy plants, their seeds and progency 
with high yield traits’. Though the patent application was filed simultaneously in over a hundred countries, 
including the US and countries in Europe, the group’s particular objection in the Chinese context, was the 
large scale consequences the patent would have in a country where 90 per cent of the world’s wild soya is 
growing and which is a centre of diversity for the crop (Greenpeace 2001). While Monsanto claimed that 
it was pursuing a patent for the technology only in the US, Greenpeace argued that Chinese exports would 
be affected and that farmers will live with the risk of patent infringement which may be pursued under 
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WTO rules. The Greenpeace claims attracted front page coverage in the critical Chinese newspaper 
Southern Weekend, which claimed that Chinese farmers unwittingly ignoring a Monsanto patent ‘might make 
it impossible to export some Chinese soy products and could even result in international trade sanctions’ 
(Kurtenbach 2001). The timing of the story, just before China’s formal entry into the WTO, led the State 
Council to instruct MoA and SEPA to look at the issue in more detail. 52 Hence, although the application 
was made in the US, according to Kurtenbach, the episode ‘reflects a growing awareness of intellectual 
property issues in China and their bearing on the country’s fate as it opens its markets and moves into the 
World Trade Organization’ (Kurtenbach 2001). 
Despite the apparent impact of these campaigns, it is nonetheless difficult for Greenpeace to operate 
in China. The group’s main office is in Hong Kong and the Chinese group, which is only two years old, 
exists as a contact point working through local NGOs and with academics in order to preserve a 
legitimate presence in China. The group’s activities are primarily targeted at consumer education and 
disseminating global news about biotech issues within China through the group’s International Biosafety 
newsletter. The group have also funded the production of public opinion surveys in selected provinces 
aimed at gauging public acceptance and attitudes towards GM crops (Greenpeace China u.d). Essentially, 
however, biotech is viewed by Greenpeace as a useful entry point to a broader public debate about the 
future of agriculture in China. Direct engagement with policy-makers or the use of institutional channels 
in order to try to shape the domestication of global commitments is effectively a non-option in the 
Chinese context. It is almost certainly the case then that the Chinese government, in mediating these 
potential conflicts and trying to strike a balance between the promotion of biotechnology and ensuring 
adequate biosafety protection, faces less opposition than the Indian government. Smith, perhaps 
exaggerating the case, argues 
 
There is no public debate to stir up the opposition that brought the development of genetically 
modified crops to a near standstill in India. Chinese scientists are derisive about Europe’s resistance, 
which has already made China stop exporting genetically altered tobacco and soy sauce made from 
American genetically altered soybeans. 
(2000: 3) 
 
This is in spite of government claims to be making strenuous efforts to engage the public in a debate 
about biotechnology in China. Keeley cites a China Daily report on 16 August 2001 which claimed 
 
China is making progress in making democratic and scientific decisions when the outcome concerns 
the immediate interests of the public. The government has used many methods to listen to people’s 
opinions through public opinion polls, open debates and discussions. Introducing these methods in 
science-policy making is under discussion. Debates have been organised in newspapers and TV on 
                                                 
52  Greenpeace interviews, Beijing, 7 April 2003. 
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biotechnology and social and moral principles so that scientists, sociologists and the public can 
exchange their opinions directly. 
 
It is also easy to caricature the extent of civil society influence on biotech policy in India (2002: 16). 
Recent developments, such as the commercialisation of Bt cotton, suggest the limited potential of civil 
society in India to resist the development of biotechnology, even if groups have enjoyed some success in 
stalling the approval process and contesting the effectiveness of the regulatory system. For example, the 
group Research Foundation for Science, Technology and Ecology filed a writ petition with the Supreme 
Court of India challenging the legality of decisions on open field trials (RFSTE 2002). The Gene campaign 
also brought a High Court action in Delhi in 2001 claiming that the illegal sales of seed in Gujarat, 
mentioned above, were done with the government’s full knowledge. On other occasions, campaigns have 
helped to support the government. Activists have helped to strengthen India’s negotiating position in 
international trade debates, for example. Yamin argues that ‘Large-scale civil society protests against 
TRIPs in the early 1990s strengthened the Indian government’s hand in international negotiations. As a 
result, India was one of the few countries that fought actively against inclusion of TRIPs in the Uruguay 
Round’ (2003: 41).  
Alongside this legal and research-based activism, there have also been many more confrontational 
forms of protest that would not be tolerated in China. There were protests at Monsanto’s Research Centre 
in Bangalore when the company’s Bt cotton crop was authorised for commercialisation in March 2002, as 
well as large public demonstrations outside the Asia Pacific Seed Association conference in Bangalore in 
September 2000 (Scoones 2003). More drastic still, is the concerted anti-Monsanto campaign led by the 
group KRRS (Karnataka Rajya Ryota Sangha). The farmers’ group, based in Karnataka, led a campaign in 
November 1998 to “Cremate Monsanto”, burning the company’s field trial sites in the state. The same 
group orchestrated a raid on the offices of Cargill Seeds India, destroying office equipment and making 
clear their desire to see the company leave India. In doing so the group invoked the evocative 
independence slogan “Quit India” (Seshia 2002). Such campaigns have not just been directed at 
biotechnology per se, but at the forces behind the technology’s development, identified as globalisation 
and trade liberalisation. Groups such as KRRS have been quick to forge these connections. Between 18 
and 20,000 Indian farmers took to the streets of Delhi to protest against the Dunkel Draft of the then 
GATT Uruguay Round. The focus of the rally was the assertion of farmers’ rights to produce, sell and 
exchange seeds against the perceived threat to these practices posed by the entry of foreign MNCs into 
the Indian market and the rights such firms acquire under the WTO TRIPs agreement (Seshia 2002). 
Protests around China’s entry into the WTO have not been public, even if as noted above, dissenting 
voices have registered their concern within government, and there has been some access to mainstream 
media for commentators raising concerns about the impact of WTO membership on Chinese agriculture 
for example. 
Despite the claims of the Chinese government, cited above, about the extent of efforts to engage the 
public in debate about biotechnology, there have clearly been greater proactive efforts on the part of GoI 
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to involve a range of civil society groups in the formulation of policies aimed at meeting international 
commitments. A joint parliamentary committee on the Plant Varieties Bill was appointed in 1999, for 
example, visiting 15 states in the country and recording oral evidence from farmers’ organisations, experts 
and individuals. Similarly with the Biodiversity issue, while it was NGOs themselves that proposed 
consultation with government over the design of a Biodiversity Act, MoEF responded positively. The 
process of consultation that ensued led to the creation of an expert group that made recommendations 
regarding the Biodiversity Law. The final draft of the Biodiversity Bill was released by the MoEF for 
public comment and the NGO Gene Campaign produced a draft law on biodiversity that was discussed at 
national consultation seminars (Ramakrishna 2003). GEAC Chairman, A.M. Gokhale, reacting to the 
controversy about approvals of GM mustard has declared his intention to launch ‘an open house debate 
by inviting all stakeholders to sort out the issue’.53 Questions have been raised about the scope and depth 
of these consultations, and it is notable that RCGM and GEAC, the two central regulatory committees, 
have no formal requirement to involve NGO and industry representatives, even if they can be invited to 
participate as individual experts (Gupta 2000). But perhaps the fact that such consultations occur at all, 
highlights an important contrast with the policy style adopted by the Chinese government where 
consultations on most questions discussed in this paper have principally been undertaken within 
government. 
It is difficult to form an accurate overall assessment of the extent to which the activities of civil 
society groups have successfully altered the ways in which global policy commitments have been 
interpreted and implemented in practice. Clearly in the case of India, challenges, legal and political, to the 
conduct of the process and the absence of public consultation have led to gestures ostensibly aimed at 
opening the process up. Vocal groups, however unrepresentative of levels of broader public engagement 
with the issues, have succeeded in raising the profile of biosafety issues and in so doing perhaps 
strengthened the hand of allies within government such as the Ministry of Environment and Forests. In 
China, SEPA has not been able to draw on allies in civil society in such an explicit way, though clearly 
publicity attracted to the Bt cotton controversy leant support to concerns they had been expressing. 
Instead, as noted above, they have relied on the authority provided by the Protocol itself to argue for a 
stronger emphasis on biosafety than their counterparts in the Ministry of Agriculture would like to see. 
 
7  Conclusion 
As relatively powerful developing countries, both India and China have attempted to domesticate global 
obligations in ways which conform with their domestic priorities. They have been able to resist, to a 
greater degree than many other developing countries, bilateral and commercial trade pressures to revise 
and reform their regulations to suit the needs of biotech multinationals or leading exporters of GMOs. 
China had to go some way to assure the US that its regulations were not discriminatory towards US 
exports and that interim arrangements would be put in place so as not to jeopardise the lucrative global 
                                                 
53  ‘Scientists raise eyebrows over GM crop safety’, The Financial Express, 25 November 2002. 
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soybean trade. But its position across a range of issues continues to embody sufficient ambiguity and 
flexibility that it can preserve policy space to manoeuvre a position that reflects an evolving sense of the 
national interest. In some cases, the government position has been quite overtly oppositional to western 
commercial interests, the ban on foreign investment in the biotech sector in China being one obvious 
example.  
The government of India has also been subject to intense foreign pressure, regarding its patent 
legislation in particular. It has been strongly encouraged to adopt a process-based patenting system that 
would allow firms to patent biological processes rather than just end products. The exemptions India 
included in its pre-TRIPs legislation in the areas of agriculture and pharmaceuticals in particular, as well as 
both its large domestic market and competitive potential as an exporter of these products, made India one 
of the targets of US global efforts to tighten IPRs. India has until 2005 to provide product patent 
protection that it has hitherto denied following a ten year transition period.  The implementation of the 
provision has already been the subject of WTO dispute settlement. It remains the case, however, that 
despite these pressures the Indian government has sought to find creative ways of squaring the 
strengthening of the scope and enforcement of IPRs as required by TRIPs, with its long-standing 
commitment to balance IPRs against other policy goals such as public health and food security (Yamin 
2003: 41). 
Rather like the case of China, the Indian government has also been subject to lobbying from 
individual firms whose products are under consideration for approval. This has been documented at 
greater length elsewhere (Newell 2003a). The government of India has ultimately had to resist these 
pressures for some time, however, due to a combination of under-developed regulatory safeguards, the 
sorts of vocal pressure from civil society groups described above, and the slow process of learning by 
doing that characterises any bureaucratic procedures that are being operationalised for the first time. The 
relative importance of China and India as potential markets for GM products, the relatively advanced level 
of skills and infrastructure that the two countries can provide, as well as their function as symbolic 
signifiers for other developing countries about the future direction of biotechnology, all mean that 
exporters are willing to invest considerable effort in engaging and working with both governments to 
ensure that regulations are designed that accommodate, in important ways, their commercial needs.  
The lack of civil society resistance, and the strong commitment from the Chinese government, was 
enough to drive biotech development in the early years. More recently, WTO membership and the need to 
identify more strategically where China’s strengths lie in global market terms appears to have precipitated 
a re-evaluation of priorities. China has created a space to do this through a combination of strategic use of 
prevailing concerns about biosafety to challenge the unregulated import of GMOs from foreign investors, 
and the careful construction of regulations that are likely to benefit Chinese producers and traders more 
than foreign actors trying to operate in the Chinese market. It may be true to say that China is less openly 
vocal about its concerns regarding global trade and environmental instruments in the arenas where these 
are negotiated, but nevertheless finds creative ways to interpret and enforce it’s obligations in a manner 
that leads critics to allege that the intent of those commitments is being subverted. India, on the other 
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hand, adopts a different negotiating style, more openly questioning of measures proposed by international 
institutions but perhaps ultimately more willing to meet the letter of those agreements when it comes to 
national enforcement. 
The extent to which the domestic biotechnology policy processes of the two countries are shaped by 
global economic forces and the constraints imposed by international agreements to which they are party 
is, in part, a function of the role they see for biotechnology in their national agricultural systems. Within 
both countries, the debate about the role of biotechnology in agricultural development has strongly 
emphasised, rhetorically at least, the extent to which the technology can help to tackle problems of food 
insecurity within the country. While both countries are self-sufficient in food, poverty and problems of 
distribution, storage and transportation conspire to leave many people under-nourished and without 
access to food. There may be strong reasons for assuming, therefore, that both countries could develop 
relatively autonomous biotech strategies aimed at serving domestic need rather than global market 
requirements. The rhetoric within policy circles and emanating from biotech firms would suggest that this 
is the case. And yet what we see from the analysis above, is a desire on the part of both countries to be 
global players in biotechnology. To do this means meeting the requirements and obligations of global 
trade accords and attempting to reconcile these with corresponding commitments in environmental 
agreements such as the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. It means trying to define a competitive niche in 
global markets or, as in the case of China, envisaging a dual track strategy of GM and non-GM exports 
that spread the risk of being penalised by the volatile winds of shifting market realities and unpredictable 
consumer concern. As long as this desire to be key players in the global political economy of 
biotechnology persists, it is almost inevitable that international rules on trade and biosafety will continue 
to play an important, yet contested, role in their national responses to the regulation of GMOs. 
On a policy level, this analysis suggests that expectations that countries can and will implement 
international treaty obligations in common and predictable ways, an assumption embedded in many trade 
and biosafety capacity-building programmes for example, are out of touch with the reality of uneven 
implementation, foot-dragging and conscious non-implementation of articles and provisions that are seen 
to be burdensome or inappropriate to national circumstances. Theoretically, the account presented here 
suggests the need to conceive of the links between national and international policy processes in more 
dynamic and less linear ways. We have seen how particular government departments, and even particular 
groups of individuals within those departments, forge global alliances with like-minded policy-makers in 
other governments as well as with allies in the private sector and civil society. In this context, the analytical 
benefit of talking about “levels of analysis” which separate the supposedly distinct spheres of domestic 
and international politics, as prevailing approaches in International Relations tend to, is of limited 
purchase. Though there is clearly not space to develop the contents of such an approach here, a global 
policy networks approach, which might draw on the work of Risse-Kappen (1995) and Keeley and 
Scoones (2003), for example, could represent a useful advance in this regard. In explaining why some 
networks and coalitions are more able to secure their interests than others, a ‘political economy of 
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transnationalism’ (Newell 2000) might also be appropriate to a field of enquiry so intimately related to 
questions of trade and competition. 
The discursive element is important here also though. We saw how in the Indian context it serves 
some civil society groups well to construct global trade agreements as instruments of the new colonialism 
or how Chinese bureaucrats resistant to change have invoked socialist ideology to question the “anti-
socialist” agenda of the WTO (Breslin 2003). Business groups and “globalising bureaucrats” equally 
represent WTO membership as central to the prospects of economic growth. While some international 
instruments, including elements of the Cartagena Protocol, are seen as burdensome and unenforceable, 
other aspects are seen as enshrining key rights and affording important safeguards against the risks 
associated with GMOs. The observation about bureaucratic politics that “where you stand is determined 
by where you sit” is pertinent to understanding the process by which global commitments get refracted 
through the prism of bureaucratic and discursive politics at the national level. 
The account provided in this paper also underscores the importance of seeing states not as 
theoretically bound and homogenous entities, but rather as complex configurations of competing political 
and bureaucratic units adopting unique policy styles and embedded in different ways within the sorts of 
global economic and policy networks described above. Taking states and the question of state-form 
seriously, requires us to move beyond viewing global politics as the product of relations beyond the state 
to look instead for the sources of global policy within the state and its networks to global coalitions of 
interest. It also requires us to locate the roots of domestic policy processes within the global coalitions 
that transcend state boundaries to simultaneously create opportunities and constraints within which states 
have to operate. Only then will we be well positioned to capture the dynamic nature of the global politics 
of biotechnology and the multiple theatres in which it is staged. 
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